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Abstract 
 
 
Nowadays, property owners or their resident’s organizations commonly appoint 
professional property management companies to manage their properties as properties are 
extremely high valued. The study of Hastings & Wong (2006) indicated that the existence 
of an IO and a PMC will add values on property prices. However, there is very no 
academic research investigating whether the nature of PMCs has any effect on price.  
 
Different kinds of property management companies (PMC) coexist in property 
management market in Hong Kong. They can be developer subsidiaries, property 
consultant groups or simply general property management companies. Since there is no 
statuary guideline for selection of PMCs, property owners or their resident’s organization 
can only select a PMC based on their researches and opinions from other resident’s 
organization in their community.  
 
The research tries to test the model in Hastings & Wong (2006) by a different area in 
Hong Kong and further study whether property owners are willing to pay a price premium 
for a certain type of PMC under conditions of an extremely competitive and price-driven 
industry.  
 
The empirical results show that property owners are willing to pay a premium at 12.72% 
for a property managed by IO and 16.06% for a property managed by an IO and a PMC 
compared with a similar property without resident’s organization. A property managed by 
an IO and a PMC which is a developer subsidiary can be sold at a premium 11.2% over 
property managed by an IO and a general PMC.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the Research  
 
Property is commodity which can be used for personal occupation and for investment 
purposes. Property has been used for representation of wealth for a long time. It is also 
true in Hong Kong where property price, with the exception of the Asian Finance Crises 
in 1998 and SARS in 2003, have increased in past twenty years (See Appendix I). The 
number of transactions has grown greatly from 72,974 in 2002 to 123,575 in 2007 (See 
Appendix II). Given that most people have access to limited resources they will try their 
best to utilize the values of their resources according to their preference, tastes and 
aspirations. For that reason, property owners are eager to maintain or upgrade their 
property values as properties are high-valued resources.  
 
Based on the extremely high property prices and as properties become investment 
products, property management gradually becomes an important and essential element in 
real estate industry. General speaking, from owners point of view, there are two 
objectives for property management. The basic one is to satisfy the physical needs of 
occupants. The occupiers would expect their property manager to provide daily 
operational service such as cleaning and security and physical maintenance such as 
repairing building service facilities. A second consideration is to maintain or increase the 
value of properties. They expect their property manager to provide value-added facilities 
and service. 
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The multiple ownership and occupation of high rise property is very common in Hong 
Kong. The property rights tenure interests of the properties owners are held on a common 
law basis. The legal tenure system in Hong Kong was derived from United Kingdom 
during the time of British colony. Owners hold as tenants in common of the Government 
land lease with shares in undivided whole. This means that there is no separate ownership 
of the building and all the shareholders are the co-owners of the property. Relationship 
between owners is initially governed by legal contractual agreement, the Deed Mutual 
Covenant (DMC), which is signed between developer and the first purchaser, binding all 
future parties.  
 
Apart from DMC, some rights and restrictions are imposed under the Building and 
Management Ordinance (BMO) which is a statutory provision. Incorporated Owners (IO) 
can be formed under BMO as a statutory body of owners which has the rights of 
appointment, monitoring, control and dismiss of any appointed property manager.  
Although the property managers may be clearly specified in DMC, they so called DMC 
property manager, owners still have a right to dismiss them under BMO. Therefore, the 
property owners has the fully control of the appointment and dismissal of the property 
management companies. 
 
Different kinds of property management companies (PMC) coexist in property 
management market in Hong Kong. They can be developer subsidiaries, property 
consultant groups or simply general property management companies. Since there is no 
statuary guideline for selection of PMCs, property owners or their resident’s organization 
can only select a PMC based on their researches and opinions from other resident’s 
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organization in their community. However, they may not have enough resources and time 
for searching for a suitable PMC, so they bear a risk for choosing a poor performing PMC. 
 
It is not difficult to find news related to bad performances of PMCs. In December 2007, 
there was a PMC which managed three large public estates located in Tin Shui Wa and 
Tseung Kwan O went into liquidation suddenly. Over 1 million dollars in salaries were 
owed to its staff. Although after the liquidation, the Housing Authority immediately 
managed these three estates, the property management services were affected and owners 
had to appoint a new PMC.  There was another case in September 2007. A manager of a 
PMC was punished by the court for 1.5 years imprisonment because of default payment 
of salary. On the other side, different organizations such as Hong Kong Management 
Authority and Hong Kong Q-mark Council price awards to good performance PMCs. It is 
observed that PMCs which are developer subsidiaries obtained the greatest number of 
awards (See Appendix III). This may imply that the services provided by them have a 
higher quality.  
 
The Hong Kong Association of Property Management Companies Ltd. is an organization 
promoting professional knowledge of property management and uplifting overall service 
standard and image of the industry. Their membership includes most of Hong Kong’s 
leading PMCs. Based on these PMCs, it is found that the developer subsidiaries managed 
more properties in their portfolios compared to others (See Appendix IV).   
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Number of Property Managed by Different Types 
of Property Management Companies
Developer 
Subsidiaries
62%
General PMC
21%
Consultant 
Groups
13%
Other 
4%
 
Table 1-1 : Number of Property Managed by Different Types of Property 
Management Companies 
(Source: The Hong Kong Association of Property Management Companies Ltd, March 
2008) 
 
It seems that property owners tend to choose developer subsidiaries as their managers. 
This may related to the fact that the developer subsidiaries are the DMC managers 
because developers want to have more control of their properties and extend their 
business to property management sector. However, property owners have the powers to 
dismiss a PMC if they want so there should be some advantages for choosing a developer 
subsidiary. 
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The demand for professional property management increases due to requirement for a 
better living environment and as property values become highly important to property 
investors. Therefore, the demand of PMCs will be very high in the future, which will 
result in increased supply of provided companies. In consequence, property management 
industry becomes highly competitive. The types and qualities of services provided by 
PMCs will be greatly dependent on the management fee under this competitive industry.  
 
The study of Hastings & Wong (2006) indicated that the existence of an IO and a PMC 
will add values on property prices. However, there is no academic research investigating 
whether the nature of PMCs has any effect on price. The research tries to test the model in 
Hastings & Wong (2006) by a different area in Hong Kong and further develop the model 
to examine whether property owners are willing to pay a price premium for a certain type 
of PMC under conditions of an extremely competitive and price-driven industry.  
 
1.2 Research Question 
 
The research question is: 
 
“Does the nature of the property management company have any impact on the price of 
private residential property in Hong Kong?” 
 
The question is asked since although property management as a value-added industry has 
been confirmed which professional property management enhances the values of 
properties. However, the nature of the property management company has been ignored. 
The aim of the research is to investigate whether there is a relationship between property 
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price and the nature of the different kinds of PMCs to property values and examine 
whether property owners are willing to pay a price premium for a particular type of PMC. 
 
An institutional approach has been adopted in answering this question. The appointment 
of a PMC by property owners is a transaction. The literature on institutional arrangement 
and transaction costs will be reviewed as a foundation to understand the characteristics of 
a transaction and behaviour assumptions of the decision makers and the types of 
transaction costs incurred in a transaction. Then, principal and agency theory is examined 
to demonstrate the characteristics of PMCs as an agent and agency costs incurred. After 
that, property management industry of private residential property in Hong Kong, which 
is highly competitive and price-driven, will be examined to assist and support the 
empirical research. Besides, the participants in property management industry in Hong 
Kong (i.e. PMCs) will be investigated. A hedonic price model is used to assess the 
relationship between the nature of the PMC and property values. As a result, the impact 
of the nature of the PMC on property prices can be found.  
 
1.3 Objectives of the Research 
 
The objectives of the research are: 
 
1. To examine the theory and literature on the economics of institutional 
arrangements and transaction costs 
2. To apply the above theory and literature to property management practice. 
3. To study the property management industry in Hong Kong 
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4. To investigate the different types of property management companies in Hong 
Kong 
5. To empirically test whether the existence of an institutional arrangement for 
collective decision making and the existence of PMC add value to properties in 
Hong Kong.  
6. To empirically test and explain the impact of the nature of the property 
management company on private residential property price in Hong Kong  
 
1.4 Structures of the Research  
 
The research consists of seven chapters. 
 
Chapter One is the introduction which explains the birth of this research and structures 
the growth of the research. It first introduces the background of the research and how the 
research questions devised. Objectives of the research and structure of this research are 
discussed after that. 
 
Chapter Two has a two-part literature review. The first part provides literature review on 
new institutional economics. The second part provides literature review on principal and 
agency theory. Theses two parts together will help to devise a theoretical framework for 
the purpose of analysis of the property management industry in Hong Kong. 
 
Chapter Three provides the institutional arrangements of property management in Hong 
Kong and the characteristics of property management industry in Hong Kong. Then, 
different kinds of property managers are introduced. 
 8 
 
Chapter Four explains the research methodology. A hedonic price model is introduced. 
 
Chapter Five devises an empirical model and hypothesis for this research based on the 
literature reviews. 
 
Chapter Six reports the findings of the empirical model. 
 
Chapter Seven discusses the results reported in Chapter Six. Then, conclusion, limitations 
and recommendation of the research will be discussed as an ending. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
New Institutional Economics and Principal-Agency Theory 
 
Part One: New Institutional Economics 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Economics is the science of choice (Pejovich, 1995). People have unsatisfied wants but 
resources are limited. This means that people must give up something before they can get 
something. The choices of them are accordance with their utilities which determined by 
their tastes, preferences, aspirations and values. People try their best to learn about 
alternatives, interpreting them, and choosing those which they expect to make them better 
off. 
 
The complexity of the environment, the computational limitations of the individual, and 
our inability to predict the behaviour of others affect each individual’s capacity to 
understand, process, and utilize information about the environment (Pejovich, 1995). 
Institutions like so called “rule of the games” are developed by individual to facilitate the 
choice of individual under constraints. Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction (North, 
1990). In order word, institutions help lower cost of making their decisions. Institutions 
reduce transaction costs for human interaction. Institutional economics emerges in this 
context to examine what mechanisms could allocate resources to maximize the utilities of 
people in a legally, socially and customarily acceptable manner.  
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Williamson (1985) also mentioned that transaction costs are the economic equivalent of 
friction in physical systems. It is an element cannot be avoided, eliminated or averted but 
can only minimize it under a realistic world where information is costly. Rational people 
seek ways to minimize the transaction costs incurred in transactions. The common and 
effective way is to through enforced and stable institutions. 
 
In this chapter, the nature of institutions is first examined. They are formal and informal 
institutions. Then the characteristics of transaction costs will be discussed.  
 
2.2 New Institutional Economics 
 
Rao (2003) defined New Institutional Economics (NIE) as it deals with the origins, 
incidence and ramifications of transaction costs. It is suitable for solving complex 
problems involving transaction, political issues and human behaviour. Unlike 
Neoclassical Economic, under the concept of NIE, information is deemed to be costly. 
People cannot make decisions on the basis of full and relevant information. NIE is an 
economic perspective that attempts to extend economics by focusing on the social and 
legal norms and rules that underly economic activity. It seeks to apply the reasoning of 
social science into economics.  
 
2.3 Institutions 
 
Markets are imperfect and resources are limited so institutions are used to reduce the 
uncertainties involved in human interactions. Rao (2003)  noted that institutions are the 
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rules of conduct of a society and include humanly devised structural constraints. 
Individual developed institutions under constraints. They provide frameworks within 
which human interaction take place. Pejovich (1995) also defined institutions as the legal, 
administrative and customary arrangements for repeated human interactions. Human 
interactions can be done under a systematic and formulated way. Therefore, institutions 
like so called “rule of the game”. They can enhance the predictability of human behaviour 
Pejovich (1995) so that uncertainties can be reduced. North (1990) claimed that 
institutions reduce costs of exchange and production and uncertainty by providing a stable 
structure (but not necessarily efficient) to everyday. Since uncertainties and the chance of 
conflict are reduced, the cost of human exchange can be reduced. 
  
There are two types of institutions: formal and informal. Formal institutions include rules 
that people devise such as statutes of law and regulations. Informal institutions are social 
conventions, s set of moral, ethical, and behaviour norms which constrain the way in 
which the rules and regulations are specified and enforcement is carried out North (1990). 
Pejovich (1995) also agreed that the prevailing institutional framework in a society 
consist of both formal and informal rules. 
 
One point should be noted here to avoid misunderstanding of the function of institutions. 
Institutions are only the rules for human interaction to reduce transaction costs. They are 
not necessary either efficient or effective. A mixture of rules, informal norms and 
enforcement characteristics together determine the choice and results in outcomes. But 
how well do institutions solve the problems? It is determined by the motivation of the 
players (their utility function), the complexity of the environment, and the ability of the 
players to decipher and order the environment (measurement and enforcement) (North, 
 12 
1990). Pejovich (1995) made a similar point that institutions must be credible (i.e. 
enforced) and stable in order to perform well. Before going to details, the natures and 
functions of formal institutions and informal institutions are first examined.  
 
2.3.1 Formal Institutions 
 
Formal rules are constitutions, statutes, common laws and other governmental regulations 
which are externally enforced (Pejovich, 1995). Formal rules can be divided into political 
(and judicial) rules, economic rules, and contracts. They can be ranked from constitutions, 
to statute and common law, to specific by laws, and finally to individual contracts defines 
constraints, from general rules to particular specifications (North, 1990).  Political rules 
broadly define the hierarchical structure of the polity its basic decision structure such as 
ordinances and regulations issued by the government. Economic rules define property 
rights which are the right to freely use it, the right to derive income from it, and the right 
to transfer it in whole or in part to another person  Cheung (1974).   Contracts contain the 
term specific to a particular agreement in exchange by the parties involved. On the other 
hand, a variety of exchanges arise in which today’s legislation can only be enacted by 
commitments made for a future date. North (1990) suggested that to lower the costs of 
exchange, it was necessary to have formal institutions to govern the exchange over space 
and time. 
 
Apart from facilitation of human interactions, formal institutions can also complement 
and increase the effectiveness of informal constraints (North, 1990).  They may lower 
information, monitoring, and enforcement costs and hence make informal institutions able 
to deal with more complex exchange. In addition, formal rules have the power to modify, 
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revise, or replace informal constraints. However, since culturally or informally derived 
constraints are very powerful, sometime it is not easy to supersede or change the existing 
informal constraints with new formal rules.  
 
2.3.2 Informal institutions 
 
Informal institutions are conventions, social norm, ethics and customs dictated by society 
which are dependent upon the culture of the society. Boyd & Richerson (1985 in North 
1990) gave a clear definition of culture which is the ‘transmission from one generation to 
the next, via teaching and imitation, of knowledge, values, and other factors that influence 
behaviour.’ Culture determines individuals’ behaviour and information processing and 
hence may affect the way informal constraints get specified. Boyd & Richerson (1985 in 
North 1990) suggested that informal rules have their origins in the experiences, traditional 
values, ethos, religious beliefs, ethnicity and other factors that influence the subjective 
perceptions individuals form to interpret reality. Unlike formal institutions, informal 
institutions seldom are clearly written rules. 
 
In the absence of the state and formal rules, a dense social network leads to the 
development of informal structures with substantial stability (North, 1990) . Informal 
institutions can act like formal institutions to facilitate human interactions by reducing 
costs and uncertainties. Actually, the main function of informal institutions is to 
supplement the roles of formal institutions. Due to limited information and limited 
computational ability, the precision and complexity of formal institutions devised by 
human may not be sufficient to reduce the costs of human interactions. The role of 
informal institutions is to extend, elaborate, and modify of formal rules (North, 1990).  
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There is a close relationship between the formal and informal institutions. Underlying 
informal constraints are formal rules. Pejovich (1995) suggested that some of informal 
rules make formal rules less costly. They have frequently outlived formal rules. Moreover, 
internal standards of conduct can be enforced by informal rules. They are specific and 
different from nations to nations, countries to countries, organizations to organizations. 
 
2.4 Transaction Cost Economics  
 
As mentioned before, institutions are the rules reduce the costs of human interaction. 
Transaction Cost Economics (TEC) is used to investigate the economic mechanisms and 
organizations based on characteristic of transactions and human behaviour under 
institutional arrangement. Williamson (1996) also mentions that TCE adopts a contractual 
approach to the study of economic organization.  
 
2.4.1 Definition of Transaction Cost  
 
The concept of transaction costs was first discussed by Ronald Coase’s paper The Nature 
of the Firm. It is used to develop a theoretical framework for predicting when certain 
economic tasks would be performed by firms, and when they would be performed on the 
market. Transaction cost economics is used to explain a number of different behaviours. 
How transactions costs affect human behaviour would be discussed later. We now focus 
on what transaction costs are. 
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Transaction costs under economic system are similar to friction in physical systems which 
cannot be fully eliminated. Whenever there are interactions or activities under economics 
system, transaction costs incur.  The major rational behind transaction cost economics is 
information is not free. Eggertsson (1989) mentioned that when information is costly, 
various activities related to the exchange of property rights between individuals and 
enforce their exclusive rights give rise to transaction costs.  
 
A number of scholars have given their efforts on identification of the categories of 
transaction costs to give a better understanding of the nature of transaction costs. To 
examine them, it is possible to work out measures to minimize the transaction costs as 
rational people act in a transaction-cost-minimizing manner (Williamson, 1989). 
 
Williamson (1985) suggest that transaction costs include:  
 
1. Search and information costs.  
2. Costs of negotiating and forming a contract or agreement 
3. Costs of monitoring and enforcing a contract or agreement 
  
Rao (2003) agreed the classification proposed by Williamson (1985) and named it as 
market–based transaction costs. He further proposed two other categories of transaction 
costs. They are managerial and political transaction costs.  
 
Managerial Transaction Costs are   
 
1. Costs of setting up or establishment and/or adaptation of organizational features 
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2. Costs of operating an organizational entity, including those of information 
gathering and processing as well as alternative modes of resource deployment.  
 
Political Transaction Cost is simply the costs of broader institutional configurations with 
which other institutions and organizations exist. 
 
 
Eggertsson (1989) suggested transaction costs rise by human activities including: 
1. The search of information about the distribution of price and quality of 
commondities and labour inputs, and the search for potential buyers and sellers 
and for relevant information about their behaviour and circumstances. 
2. The bargaining that is needed to find the true position of buyers and sellers when 
prices are endogenous 
3. The making of contracts 
4. The monitoring of contractual partners to see whether they abide by the term of 
the contract 
5. The enforcement of a contract and the collection of damages when partners fail to 
observe their contractual obligations 
6. the protection of property rights against third-party enforcement  
 
North (1990) defined transaction costs are costs of transacting, which consist of 
  
1. Costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged 
2. Costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements. 
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Cheung (2002) suggested that transaction costs take four main forms: 
 
1. The cost of acquiring information 
2. The cost of negotiating the price to be paid, 
3. The cost of charging for the use of resources, and  
4. The cost (or impossibility) of excluding ‘free riders’ form consuming resources 
they have not provided or paid for. 
 
2.4.2 Definition of Transaction costs used in the Research  
 
To analyze the transaction costs of appointment of property management companies by 
property owners in Hong Kong, the classification of transaction costs from Willamson 
(1985) are adopted as the framework for this study. They are (1) Search and information 
costs, (2) Costs of negotiating and bargaining for forming a contract or agreement, and (3) 
Costs of monitoring and enforcing a contract or agreement. They are general and simple. 
These costs are interdependent and therefore must be addressed simultaneously rather 
than sequentially or separable (Williamson, 1985). 
 
2.4.2.1 Search and Information Costs 
 
Information costs are zero if information is perfect and symmetrical among parties. Since 
people do not have sufficient information about what they transacted, it incurs costs of 
measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged. North (1995) states that 
transaction costs arise because of the costs of measuring the multiple valuable dimensions 
involved in exchange (broadly, information cost). The information costs used for better 
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understanding of good and/or service is being transacted in order to fully utilize the 
values of them. Resources are limited so people want to lower the costs for searching 
information in order to get higher values of the resources or simply high utilities of 
themselves.  
 
Rao (2003) suggested that the role of information costs in TCE is important both in direct 
cost terms as well as in their impact on the economic behaviour of economic actors or 
entities comprising a combination of heterogeneously placed decision-makers. 
Information costs have their roles when people making decision and people try to 
minimize the information costs to make the best decision. In the world of uncertainty and 
incomplete knowledge, Resources needed to produce information. The search cost might 
prevent people from discovering the best alternative Pejovich (1995). If the search and 
information costs are high, people will not be willing to enter the transaction even there 
are certain gains form the transaction. Therefore, people cannot fully utilize the value of 
their resources.  
 
 
 
2.4.2.2 Negotiation and Bargaining Costs 
 
We presume that there is may be some advantages for parties to negotiate rather than 
working alone. However, it is impractical to specify all details of the transaction. 
Negotiation and bargaining occurs as parties involved in the transaction may not have all 
relevant information about goods and services they are being transacted such as their 
values and functions. Parties want to capture all potential gains through negotiation and 
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bargaining. However, it is not free. The parties have to provide time, money, resources 
and all the opportunity costs. Pejovich (1995) suggested market competition can reduce 
the negotiation and bargaining costs in three different ways. First, standardized contracts 
enable the parties to avoid the cost of negotiating the terms of contract for each and every 
exchange they make. Second, competition forces parties to seek and offer contractual 
terms that satisfy preference of the median consumer in their market so the accepted 
parties get high satisfactions and it can reduce the negotiation among parties. Warranties, 
guarantees and return privileges can reduce the risk of purchasing goods in advance 
whose attributes cannot be shown immediately. These can avoid negotiation because of 
uncertainties of the goods and services. The last solution can be substantial if reputation is 
matter.  
 
2.4.2.3 Monitoring and Enforcement Costs 
 
Both formal and informal institutions govern human interactions. The efficiency of the 
institutions mainly depends on enforcement. There exists a high likelihood that the rent-
seeking phenomenon operates vigorously during that transition if there are insufficient 
safeguards of the law and its enforcement (Rao, 2003). Enforcement mechanism reduces 
the costs of exchange, eliminates the time horizon problem and provides incentives for 
resources to move to their highest-values uses. Pejovich (1995) states that costs arise in 
monitoring of contractual partners to see whether they abide by the terms of the contracts. 
Costs also arise in enforcing of a contract and the collection of damages when partners 
fail to observe their contractual obligations (Eggertsson, 1990).  
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The enforcement can be done by means of self-enforcement where the parties live up to 
the contract they signed or done by the parties themselves or a third party. The 
enforcement costs are high for the later two. Self-enforcement occurs when there is a 
great deal of knowledge and repeated dealings where the benefits of living up to contracts 
will exceed the costs (North, 1990). The market also provides a mechanism of 
enforcement. Pejovich (1995) suggested that those who repeatedly fail to perform their 
side of the bargain lose business to their competitor. Reputation developed if parties’ 
performances are good. A reputable dealer gets a higher price for the same good or 
service than a fly-by-night operator. Therefore, the reputable dealer may have a higher 
incentive for self-enforcement than a general dealer. On the other hand, parties can 
enforce each other by observation but it may not be efficient because parties themselves 
may not know how to assess the quality of the service they received or to judge whether 
they are complied with the contract (Gronroos, 1990).  Employment of a third party for 
enforcement may raise other enforcement matter as well.   
 
 
 
 
 
2.5 Elements affecting transaction costs 
 
Williamson (1985) identifies five elements of a transaction which all create friction and 
affect the costs of transaction. The five elements are divided into two groups: 
Characteristics of transactions and Behvioural Assumptions 
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Characteristics: 
1. Uncertainty  
2. Frequency  
3. Asset specificity  
 
Behavioural Assumptions: 
1. Boundary Rationality  
2. Opportunism 
 
Actually, North (1990) also suggested two human behaviour which are ‘Deciphering the 
environment’ and  ‘Motivation’. They are similar to the behaviour assumptions proposed 
by Williamson (1985). 
 
Williamson (1985) suggested that transaction cost economics maintains that there are 
rational economics reasons for organizing some transactions one way and other 
transactions another. The principal dimensions with respect to which transactions differ 
are asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency. 
 
Transaction costs rise because of human interactions. If we want to minimize the costs of 
transaction, we should first investigate how human behave. Bridgeman (1955 in North 
1990) believed that studying how the minds of men work is needed for an understanding 
of the actions of men. Coase (1984) also agreed that modern institutional economics 
should study man as he is, acting within the constraints imposed by real institutions.  
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2.5.1 Asset specificity  
 
Williamson (1985) proposed that asset specificity refers to durable investments that 
undertaken in support of particular transactions. The assets should be non-fungible which 
tied to particular transactions specified by contracts or other commitments Rao (2003). 
Assets are specific when they are essential and non-replaceable elements to a specified 
transaction so the values they provided should be much more highly valuable only in that 
use, relative any other alternative uses. In order word, the opportunity cost of which 
investments is much lower in best alternative uses Williamson (1985) or they simply 
don’t have any value in other use.  
 
The continuity of the relationship among parties is valued only the specific identity of the 
parties to a transaction plainly matters in these circumstances (Williamson, 1985). The 
more specific assets, the higher transaction costs would be raised because more search 
and information costs are needed for finding out all the relevant information of the assets 
such as the market values, functions and attributes of the assets. Although the importance 
of asset specificity to transaction cost economics is difficult to exaggerate, it is 
importance in conjunction with bounded rationality opportunism and in the presence of 
uncertainty (Williamson, 1985).  
 
2.5.2 Frequency 
 
Frequency can be interpreted to how often the parties transacted.  Pejovich (1995) 
suggested that as time goes by, individuals become better acquainted with the rules. They 
learn how to adjust to the system, identify exchange opportunities, and exploit the most 
 23 
beneficial ones. This means that high frequency can be reduced the transaction costs 
among parties. Williamson (1985) also stated that the cost of specialized governance 
structures will be easier to recover for large transactions of a recurring kind. Hence the 
frequency of transactions is a relevant dimension.  
 
Repeated dealing can lower the search and information costs as parties always get certain 
knowledge and information about both the parties and what is being transacted. In 
addition, negotiation costs would be reduced if the transactions are similar. Even through 
there are negotiation costs, the costs should be lower than the benefits the parties gain as 
the negotiation would be focused on the improvement of previous transactions.  
 
2.5.3 Uncertainty  
 
Williamson (1985) claimed that behavioural uncertainty is of special importance to an 
understanding of transaction cost economics issues. Before going into detailed discussion 
of uncertainty, it is necessary to distinguish between risk and uncertainty. Risk is the 
probability of the occurrence of which can be assessed by statistical means. Uncertainty is 
the probability of the occurrence which cannot be assessed. Therefore, risk can be 
reduced by frequently transactions but uncertainty cannot. Any reference to frequency is 
inappropriate, as uncertainty always deal with unique events. North (1990) suggested that 
uncertainties arise from incomplete information with respect to the behaviour of other 
individuals in the process of human interaction.  
 
Clearly, the more uncertainties, the greater the transaction costs in term of search and 
information costs, negotiation and bargaining costs and enforcement costs.  The greater 
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the uncertainty of the buyer, the lower the value of the assets (North, 1990). Williamson 
(1985) also mentioned that uncertainty of a strategic kind is attributable to opportunism. 
People may try to take advantages with each other under uncertainty.  
 
2.5.4 Bounded Rationality 
 
Williamson (1985) suggested that bounded rationality is the cognitive assumption on 
which transaction cost economics relies. It would affect the behaviour and decision-
making of people.  North (1990) also pointed out a similar human behaviour which is 
“deciphering the environment”. Their rational behind are more or less the same. Mind is 
scarce resource Simon (1978 in North 1990) so people are limited in knowledge, foresight, 
skill, and time. Therefore, the human behaviour is “intendedly rational, but only limitedly 
so” (Williamson, 1985). 
 
Rao (2003) proposed the reasons for bounded rationality are informational uncertainties 
and informational complexities. People process incomplete information subjectively 
when making decision. They decipher the environment by processing information 
through preexisting mental constructs through with they understand the environment and 
solve the problems they confront (North, 1990). Subjective perceptions of reality play 
major parts in human being choices. Very often, they misunderstand the environment or 
problems by their subjective view. Institutions sometime developed by them to minimize 
the uncertainty. However, the more complex and unique the issues they confront, the 
more uncertain the outcome. Unless, updating the institutions according to changing 
environment, institutions may not be precise or complete to reduce the uncertainty. 
People may fail to do that simply because they don’t really understand the environment.   
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Simon (1957 in North 1990) pointed out that the capacity of the human mind for 
formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the 
problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behaviour in the real world – 
or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality. 
  
Since people mind is scarce, they want to get the best advantages under limited 
competence. However, the costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring transactions need 
expressly to be considered (Williamson, 1985).  
 
2.5.5 Opportunism  
 
Both the studies of Williamson (1985) and North (1990) proposed that human tend to 
have “self-interest seeking” behaviour. Williamson (1985) used the term “Opportunism” 
refers to the behavioural aspect self-interest seeking with guile. On the other hand, 
“Altruism” was the term used by North (1990).  
 
According to Williamson (1985), opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted 
disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, 
obfuscate, or otherwise confuse’. It is responsible for real or contrived conditions of 
information asymmetry, which vastly complicate problems of economic organization. 
Under wealth-maximizing behavioural assumption, a party may cheat, steal, or lie when 
the payoff to such activity exceeds alternative opportunities available to the party. The 
decisions or choices made might be determined not only by considerations of efficiency 
but also by considerations of personal interest or utility (Becker, 1983). 
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Human have a propensity to behave opportunistically (Williamson, 1985). Contract may 
be a tool to governance the performance among parties under various known and 
unknown contingencies, but incomplete contracts provided the chance for opportunism. It 
results in loss of efficiency and hence increase transaction costs. North (1990) gave out 
evidence with respect to ideologies, altruism, and self-imposed standards of conduct and 
suggests that the trade-off between wealth and these other values is negatively sloped 
function. Therefore, opportunism or altruism has adverse affects on the value of the 
transaction between parties.   
 
Several scholars proposed some measure to alleviate the opportunistic / altruistic 
behaviour.  Williamson (1985) suggested that opportunism is a troublesome source of 
“behavioural” uncertainty in economic transactions – which uncertainty would vanish 
either if individuals were fully open and honest in their efforts to realize individual 
advantage or, alternatively, if full subordination, self-denial, and obedience could be 
presumed. But it seems not possible and practical in the real world.  Later, P. Milgrom & 
Roberts (1998 in Williamson 1985) suggest that opportunistic behaviour can sometime be 
alleviated by subjecting the executive authority to monitoring by an outside judicial 
authority, but that procedure requires (1) specifying clearly what constitutes proper 
behaviour by the executives, (2) expending extra resources in monitoring and extra 
documentation to justify the executive’s decisions, and (3) properly motivating the 
judicial authority. This method may be useful but the costs incurred are very high such as 
the enforcement costs and information costs.  It is believed that the most efficient and 
effective ways to alleviate opportunism and altruistic is reputation. People are willing to 
avoid these behaviour to developed or maintain their reputations.  Reputation has values. 
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Reputation can be used as a tool for attracting new customers and retain the existing 
customers. If reputations are destroyed, business and a huge amount of profits will be lost. 
Therefore, reputation has a substantial effect on elimination of opportunistic / altruistic 
behaviour. 
 
2.6 Summary 
 
In short, we have reviewed the New Institutional Economics and Transaction Cost 
Economics. Under New Institutional Economics, both formal and informal institutions are 
investigated. The examples of formal institutions include laws, regulations and contracts 
which enforced by authority. Informal institutions refer to norms, customs and 
conventions which governed by society. They are used for reduce the costs incurred in 
human interactions. The nature of transaction costs is then examined. Transaction costs 
cannot be eliminated but only minimized. Scholars have classified transaction costs in 
different ways. The classification of transaction costs by Williamson (1985) is adopted in 
this research. They include search and information costs, negotiation and bargaining cost, 
monitoring and enforcement costs. Besides there are five elements affect the costs of 
transaction. Three of them (asset specific, frequency and uncertainty) are related to 
transactions and the other two refers to behaviour of decision makers (bounded rationality 
and opportunism/altruism).  
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Part Two: Principal and Agency Theory 
 
2.7 Introduction  
 
The theory of agency is a branch of the economics of transaction costs Jensen & 
Meckling (1976). Agency relationship is a kind of human interaction. People enter this 
relationship because the benefits they gained from the relationship are larger than the 
costs arisen by this relationship. Rao (2003) explained that in the general terminology of 
Transaction Cost Economic, agent costs are a form of transaction costs. Generally 
speaking, agency costs rise because of asymmetric information among parties and the 
opportunism behaviour of the agent. Bamberg & Spremann (1987) stated that behavioural 
aspects like trust, loyalty, opportunism (which are irrelevant in the pure pattern of 
contract) are central in the concept of agency. The transaction costs of the principal are 
the enforcement costs and the values loss by the opportunism behaviour by the agent. 
Rational people act in a transaction-cost-minimizing manner (Williamson, 1989), so they 
want to minimize agency cost as well.  
 
2.8 Principal and Agency Relationship  
 
The definition of agency relationship varies from scholar to scholar but the rational 
behind is similar. In general, there are two or more parties involved in an agency 
relationship. One is called principal who delegates rights while the other side is called 
agent who gain the rights from principal and represent the principal.   
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Jensen & Meckling (1976) defined agency relationship is a contract under which one or 
more persons or entities (the principals) engage another person or entity (the agent) to 
perform specified tasks or transactions on their behalf based on delegated authority and 
decision-making. 
 
According to Pratt & Zeckhauser (1985), whenever one individual depends on the action 
of another, and agency relationship arises. The individual taking the action is called the 
agent. The affected party is the principal. 
 
Eggertsson (1989) suggested an agency relationship is established when a principal 
delegates some rights – for example, user rights over a resource – to an agent who is 
bound by a (formal or informal) contract to represent the principal’s interests in return for 
payment of some kind.  
 
Rao (2003) add a new point on an agency relationship proposed that agency relationship 
exists whenever a principal or the primary stakeholder delegates authority to an agent 
whose actions have a bearing on the primary goals of the principal. 
 
Bamberg & Spremann (1987) argued that agency is delegation of choice, or rendering 
discretion. The degrees of delegation and discretion are different from case to case.  Pure 
delegation without discretion is no case of agency. In other word, if the agent can show 
his preferences and act according to his own choices, he is not an agent but a simple 
contractor. 
 
A comparison between an agency and a contract is done by Bamberg & Spremann (1987) 
 30 
 
Division of Labour Contract Agency 
Formal aspect Market Hierarchy 
Perception of actors Isolated Integrated 
Procedural aspect of 
planning 
Self-determination 
specification / 
Discreteness performance 
orientation  
Delegation 
Representation  
Discretion 
Interdependence 
Effort orientation 
Legal structure Mutual consent on two 
individual decisions to 
perform 
Unilateral authorization to 
act on behalf of principal 
Necessary rules None (fully specified 
contract is self enforcing – 
pacta sunt servanda is no 
necessary but an expedient 
rule 
Sanctions for breach of 
loyalty  
Sanctions for non-
performance of promised 
incentives  
Revelation of individual 
preference 
Does not matter Central  
Feature 
Real world paradigm(s) Exchange of goods and 
services 
Manager 
Sales agent 
Guardian 
Sharing arrangement 
Basis of legitimacy Reciprocity (mutual consent 
of parties) 
Power 
(delegation by  
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(1) consent  
(2) voting 
(3) statute 
Entitlement structure Exchange of property rights Horizontal split-up of 
property right; paradigm: 
decision control + residual 
ownership / decision 
management (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983) 
 
Table 2-1: Contract and Agency: Basic Transactional Pattern   
(Source: Bamberg & Spremann (1987))  
 
According to the comparison, the natures of an agent and a contractor are different. Agent 
is a model of delegation of preference and monitoring of discretion while a contract is  
self-determination and discreteness performance orientation. The actions of the contractor 
are fully specified in the contract. If the contractors don’t comply with terms in the 
contract, they will be in breach of contract and subject to damage claims. However, 
agency is more than that. The actions are supported by breach of loyalty and non-
performance of promised incentives.  
 
The basic pattern of cooperation is the exchange of goods, services, information, risk, or 
rights. Both principal and agent are assumed to be making their decisions optimally in 
view of their constraints. The matter arise is enforcement. The cooperating parties affects 
by their decisions the welfare of the others directly, and each party has some limitations 
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to observe the actions of others in full details. Bamberg & Spremann (1987) suggested 
that principal-agent relation is closely related to risk sharing, hidden effort, monitoring, 
hidden characteristics, screening, and self selection. 
 
2.9 Agency Cost 
 
Pratt & Zeckhauser (1985) believed that the challenge in structuring an agency 
relationship is to minimize agency costs. This is the costs for parties entering a principal 
and agency relationship. Since the relationship is a kind of human interactions, agency 
cost is a kind of transaction costs. The reasons for incurring agency costs are the 
divergence between the ideal welfare maximization and the sub-optimal maximization 
based on the agent’s motives (Rao, 2003). The objectives, goals or interest of principals 
and agents can be very different and sometime conflict with each other.  
 
Fama & Jensen (1983) defined agency costs as the costs of structuring, monitoring, and 
bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests, plus the residual loss 
incurred because the cost of full enforcement of contracts exceeds the benefits.  
 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) defined agency costs as the sum of (1) the monitoring 
expenditure by the principal (2) the bonding expenditure by the agent, and (3) the residual 
loss, i.e. the monetary equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal 
due to the divergence between the agent’s decision and “those decision which would 
maximize the welfare of the principal” The residual losses depend on agents’ risk 
preferences, time discounting, and the costs of effective monitoring by the principals, in 
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addition to the measurement costs and of devising effective operational policies for 
implementation. 
 
North (1990) also agreed that the costs for monitoring and enforcement of the 
performances of agent are the main components of agency costs. 
 
In short, agency costs incurred by agents including (1) the costs of monitoring the 
performance the agents (2) the cost of boning the parties into the term of contracts and (3) 
the residual loss which is the benefit loss if the agent’ actions and decisions are fully 
based on the interests of the principal.  Agency costs are real costs and they reduce the 
efficiency of the transaction like transaction costs. 
 
2.10 Behaviour of Agents 
 
The behaviour of agents is various, but there are two common problems caused by agency. 
Pratt & Zeckhauser (1985) called them “Hidden Information” and “Hidden Action”. 
“Hidden Information” refers to the problems caused by asymmetric information between 
principals and agents. “Hidden Action” refers to the problems caused by the actions of 
agents which are not put the interest of principal in the front. Adverse Selection and 
“Moral Hazard” are the terms used by Rao (2003) which are borrowed from the practice 
and theory of insurance. 
. 
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2.10.1 Hidden information  
 
According to Pratt & Zeckhauser (1985), hidden information problems are due to the 
agent has made some observations (eg. Information) that the principal has not made. They 
used this observation in making decisions; however, the principal cannot check whether 
the agent has used his or her information in the way that best serves the principal’s 
interest. 
 
The reason for principals enter an agency relationship is they expected the agent can do 
better work than them. The rational behind is the principal believed that the agent have 
more information about the task they delegated to them or in other word the agent can 
acquire information in a lower cost way. Pratt & Zeckhauser (1985) stated that given 
information asymmetries agents typically know more about their tasks than their 
principals do. Therefore, information is distributed asymmetrically between principals 
and agents.  
 
Asymmetric information not only is related to the tasks but also the party themselves. 
Certainly the agents know more about their own actions, abilities, and preferences 
(Eggertsson, 1989). They know which decision they are going to make but principal 
cannot fully observe the agent’s action. The asymmetric information with respect to the 
agent’s decision excludes simple agreements concerning pairs of action and payment 
(Bamberg & Spremann, 1987). 
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2.10.2 Hidden action 
 
Moral hazard, in other word hidden action is a problem of post-contractual opportunism 
in the presence of unobservable asymmetric information (Rao, 2003). According to 
Bamberg & Spremann (1987), the main concept of agency is the delegation of personal 
choice to somebody else; preferences and future choices of the agent are the explicit 
theme of agency. The agent act as a representative of the principal and he/her action 
should be accordance with the goals of the principal. However, the specified details of the 
actions may not be specified by the principals, there are rooms for agent to act in their 
own styles and methods.  Effort is a disutility to the agent, but it has a value to the 
principal in the sense that it increases the likelihood of a favourable outcome (Pratt & 
Zeckhauser, 1985). Therefore, it exist a conflict of interests between principals and agents. 
 
Williamson (1996) suggested that the principal sometime may assume agents have the 
capacity to engage in comprehensive ex ante contracting (with or without private 
information), and economic agents will reliably fulfill their promises. But the 
assumptions are not realistic. The behaviour of agents is similar to the human behaviour 
mentioned before which are bounded rationality and opportunism / altruism. The agent 
only has more information about the tasks and his/her decision than the principal but still 
subject to bounded rationality. Although the agent is supposed to be fully represented the 
principal and put the interests of the principal in the front, again it is unrealistic.  The 
agent has the tendency to be self-interest seeking. The decisions or choices made might 
be determined not only by considerations of the interest of the principal but also by 
considerations of personal interest or utility (Becker, 1983).  
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There are other two reasons for opportunistic behaviour of agents which are specific to 
principal agency relationship. They are asymmetric information and difficulties on 
enforcement.  
 
2.10.2.1 Asymmetric Information 
 
North (1990) suggested that the principal assumed they have the power of disciplining the 
agent and therefore of enforcing agreements. Likewise, the agent can monitor the 
principal and enforce his or her end of the agreement. Actually, due to asymmetric 
information among parties, the principal does not have sufficient information about the 
actions of their agents so there would be uncertainties in the transactions. The agents can 
be taken advantages from this because they have more information. Asymmetric 
information provides rooms for agents to be opportunistic. 
 
2.10.2.2 Difficulties on Enforcement 
 
The challenge in the agency relationship arises whenever which is almost always the 
principal cannot perfectly and costlessly monitor the agent’s action and information (Pratt 
& Zeckhauser, 1985). The costs of monitoring and enforcement are high since the 
principal sometime does not have enough capacity to assess the performance of the agent. 
It is difficult to enforce the action of agent under an uncertain situation (Eggertsson, 
1989). Jensen & Meckling (1976) suggested three reasons why monitoring and 
enforcement by principal are costly. One of them is that the technology of monitoring 
requires resources. The second reason is that the agent asks for new negotiations on the 
level of this welfare. It implies the existence of negotiation costs. The third reason is that 
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the utility of both principal and agent decreases. Agents often take advantages of the high 
costs of measuring their characteristics and performance and of enforcing a contract and 
engage in shirking or opportunistic behaviour (Eggertsson, 1989). The agent can make 
any promise with respect to his action and depart form it later because the principal is 
unable to control or to monitor the agent’s decision making 
  
2.11 The problems of Agent’s Behaviour 
 
With reference to Bamberg & Spremann (1987), the decisions made by agents do not 
only influence their own welfare but also the principal (the principal participates in the 
result of team work which is a consequence of the agent’s effort), Agents and principals 
have different values associated with the agent’s action. One point can be sure there 
should be an negative effects on the interest of the principal by the opportunistic 
behaviour of the agent. In other word, it reduces the efficiency of the transaction. 
Eggertsson (1989) believed that opportunistic behaviour and noncompliance with 
contracts will persists in equilibrium, if the marginal cost of monitoring agents falls short 
of marginal benefit before full enforcement of contractual agreement has been reached. 
Therefore, the principal has to bear a high agency costs in this relations including 
information costs and enforcement costs and also the benefit loss if the agents were well-
behaved.   
 
Refer to the comparison done by Bamberg & Spremann (1987), an agent is dependent on 
legal rules concerning sanctions for breach of loyalty of the agent and sanctions for non-
performance of promised incentive of the principals. Personal sanctions for deviant 
behaviour are specified including dismissal, loss of bonded items, loss of reputation, etc. 
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The preventions for opportunistic behaviour are detailed discussed in the following 
section.  
 
2.12 Selection of an Agent 
 
After the discussion about the behaviour of agents and the costs incurred by those 
behaviour, the argument moves to selection of agents and the methods for avoiding the 
adverse behaviour of agents in order to lower the agency cost.  
 
There are three measures for prevention of agency problems. They are market forces, 
incentives and reputation. 
 
2.12.1 Market Forces 
 
Monitoring is a method to prevent adverse behaviour of agents. As mentioned before, if 
monitoring is done by principal, it will be very costly. Pratt & Zeckhauser (1985) 
suggested that market is an effective monitor in many circumstances. 
 
The main reason for agency problems is the divergent objectives between principal and 
agent. Pratt & Zeckhauser (1985) believed that intellectual interest is merely a lagniappe; 
productivity is the goal. Hence, principals and agents will seek situations in which 
purpose line up naturally. The alignment of interests helps not only to assure an 
appropriate level of effort, but to promote the right choice. Alignment of objectives is 
beneficial to the performance of the agency relationship subject to agent and principal 
have an incentive to seek a good match. If the market is competitive, the principals will 
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find other agents if they think the existing one is not good enough or not suitable to them. 
In this way, the competitive market helps the principal to monitor the agents indirectly. 
 
2.12.2 Incentives 
 
Certainly, the agent’s welfare or utility depends on pairs of action and pay (he prefers 
both lower levels of effort and higher payments). The principal’s welfare depends of pairs 
of action and pay (she prefers more effort of partner as well as to give a lower pay). This 
creates a conflict of interest between them. Jensen & Meckling (1976) suggested that the 
principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for 
the agent. 
 
In a principal-agent relationship, the principal is ready to pay some kind of reward to the 
agent in return for a certain decision/action/effort Bamberg & Spremann (1987). This 
payment may depend on the result of the decision for the principal and/or on other 
information. In some listed companies, apart from paying regular agency fee, principal 
may give compensation to agents such as stocks and stock options. In this way, the role of 
agents is changed. The payment of the agents is partly depends on the performance of 
their works because the price of a stock may be influence by the work they done. 
Therefore, the agent has a high incentive to work on behalf his/her principal. Another way 
is the principal pays the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he 
will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal 
will be compensated if he does take such actions (Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1985). The can 
provide greater certainty to both parties and reduce opportunistic behaviour. 
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2.12.3 Reputation 
 
Reputation has values. Opportunistic behaviour is at least partially alleviated by norm, 
codes of conduct, and the like (Milgrom & Roberts 1998 in Williamson 1985). People are 
willing to avoid these behaviour to developed or maintain their reputations.  Therefore, 
reputation is a strong incentive for good behaviour. People who are failure to live up to 
expectations may cause to lose profitable business in the future (Milgrom & Roberts 1998 
in Williamson 1985). 
 
Reputation is more important for a service provider than a product provider. Behaviour is 
visible to others and will thus also influence their perception of reality. Services are 
obviously less well defined than physical products, and rather more difficult to try out. To 
induce the appropriate action in a client and to arouse the desirable preferences in him, it 
is necessary to communicate with him and to influence his perception of reality in more 
sophisticated ways than merely showing him a product (Normann, 1984). Therefore, 
reputation plays a substantial role to showing the capability of an agent and attracts more 
potential customers. In general, principals are more willing to pay a higher price to a 
reputable agent. It is not necessary because of the capability or competence of the agent 
but only the “name” of the agent can apparently lower their uncertainty.    
 
The reputational mechanism cannot operate effectively in fluid, impersonal, anonymous 
market setting but only in more developed markets, with the extensive communications 
among traders and repeated dealings, do market reputations matter. The efficacy of the 
reputation mechanism depends the amount of benefits gains by cheating, how quickly its 
cheating is likely to be detected, how widely its misbehaviour is known, the amount of 
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lost when the detected misbehaviour damages the firm’s reputation, and how costly it is 
to rebuild a lost reputation. In a society of long-lived, formal organizations may be 
especially effective in using reputation mechanisms. The market of the organization 
should be with extensive communications among traders and repeated dealings, do 
market reputation matter (Milgrom & Roberts, 1998). 
 
2.13 Summary 
 
This part of literature mainly reviews the theory of principal and agency. It is a branch of 
Transaction Cost Economics. The relationship between principal and agent is first 
reviewed. The relationship is established when the principal delegates his/her own rights 
to the agent. The actions done by the agent usually are not clearly specified but only the 
goals of the principal. The agent has the power of discretion when making decision 
provided that interest of principal is in the first priority. Since the divergence of interests 
between of principal and agent, costs are incurred for monitoring, enforcement and 
benefit loss and are conclusively called agency costs. The costs incurred because of 
“Hidden Information” and “Hidden Action”. They are due to asymmetric information 
among parties and opportunistic behaviour. The actions and decision of agents directly 
affect the interest of principal. Since higher the agency costs, lower the benefit of 
principal. Market force, incentives and reputation are three measures for reduction of 
agency costs. 
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
 
Property Management Services and Property Managers in Hong Kong  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a basic concept of property management and then 
detailed investigate the property management practice in private residential housing in 
Hong Kong particular in property manager aspects. After reading this chapter, the readers 
should have a clear picture about the property management industry in Hong Kong and 
the different types of property managers in Hong Kong.  
 
3.2 Definition of Property Rights and Property Management  
 
Property Rights 
 
Before the discussion of property management, we have to first understand what property 
is. Property is capable of two distinct meanings. First, it may signify title to or rights of 
ownership in goods or other things of values. Secondly, property may mean the actual 
thing or things capable of ownership. The rights of ownership are so called property right. 
Property can be privately owned or commonly owned and are called private property 
rights and common property respectively. In the context of institutional economics, 
property should be interpreted in light of the rights attached to it (Wong, Yau, & Yiu, 
2006). People don’t own property but they only own the property right of the property.  
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Cheung (1974) defined that the private property right is  
 
1. The right to freely use it,  
2. The right to derive income from it, and  
3. The right to transfer it in whole or in part to another person.  
 
The right to use means the user rights which define the potential uses of an asst that are 
legitimate for an individual, including the right to transform physically or even destroy an 
asset. The right to derive income from it means the right to earn income from an asset and 
contract over the terms with other individuals. The right to transfer implies the right to 
contract (eg. alienate or sell an asset), and property rights may be transacted through a 
wide variety of contractual arrangement. Therefore, people can exercise their property 
rights through setting up different contractual arrangement in order to fully utilize the 
values of their property. 
 
Pejovich (1995) defined private property rights in a slightly different way. He suggested 
that private property rights are the right of ownership which contains three elements:  
 
1. Exclusivity of ownership  
2. Transferability of ownership  
3. Protecting private property rights from both majority rule and/or the ruling elite 
the constitutional guarantee of ownership divorces economic wealth from political 
power. 
 
 44 
Exclusively of ownership means the owner has the right to choose what to do with an 
asset, how to use it, and who is to be given access to it. Similar to Cheung (1974), 
transferability of ownership means the owner has the right to transfer an asset to others at 
mutually agreed upon terms.  
 
In short, private property rights create a strong link between one’s right to choose how to 
use assets and bearing the consequences of that choice. It crates incentives for transaction 
costs to be reduced by those who can do this at a lower cost (Pejovich, 1995). The right of 
ownership creates strong incentive for owners to seek the highest-valued uses for their 
resources. They can transfer their resources to move from less productive to more 
productive owners so that the resources are fully utilized. Property management is not 
simply the management of property, but the governance of property rights (Wong et al., 
2006). 
 
Property management  
 
The definition of property management is different over time. The evolution of property 
management is the result of operating in a dynamic environment and reflects the changing 
nature and demand of society. Refer back to Walters (1979), he defined that the term 
“property management” refers to situations in which someone other than the owner 
oversee the operation of a property. This implied that the parties manage properties are 
the agents of the owners of such properties. The duties of the manager are only look after 
operation of the property and management of all the present and potential housing 
resources of an area so as to contain and then eliminate its housing problems (Macey and 
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Baker 1978).  Under this definition, property management refers to physical maintenance 
and security works which protect the property rights of the property owners.  
 
According to the above definition, two criteria for good property management can be 
pointed out. The manager should be able to  
1. Apply skills in caring for the property (Macey, 1982)  
2. Prevent trespassers from entering the property 
  
However, due to the rising property values and professional competition, the scope of 
property management is extended. Scarrett (1983) gave a clear definition and claimed that 
property management seeks to control property interests having regard to the short and 
long term objectives of the estate owner and particularly to the purpose of which the 
interest is held: to oversee physical maintenance and enforcement of lease covenants, to 
be mindful of the necessity of upgrading and merging interests where possible and to 
recognize opportunities for the development of potential 
 
Downs (1991) defines property management is a profession in which someone other than 
the owner supervises the operation of a property according to the owner’s objectives and 
the property’s profitability. 
 
Two new concepts of property management can be devised by these definitions. Apart 
from general physical maintenance and security, property management is a profession 
which fully utilizes the functions of the property and seeks ways for upgrading or 
increasing the values of the property. Good property managers would try their best to find 
opportunities for the highest possible development potential.  
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Later on, the market changed. It focuses on globalization, competition, corporate 
restructuring, new technology and stakeholder expectations (Edingtion, 1993) . Property 
management emphases on operating in rapidly changing environments. Property 
managers not only consider physical management, but also financial, human management. 
They use their management skills and strategic business decision making to maintain or 
enhance the values of the property. They may provide valued added services which will 
distinguish from their competitors. In addition, the managers want to keep good 
relationship between owners and tenants so that conflict can be reduced.  
 
Throughout the development of property management, property management is not only 
about physical maintenance and security, but is a professional aspect which focuses on 
enhancement of values of property and coordinates the occupiers within a property or a 
community.  
  
3.3 Importance of Property Management 
 
As lands are limited, people want to fully utilize the functions of their properties so that 
they can general as much as profits from them. Property management plays an important 
role in this situation. Baldwin (1994) comments that the provision of a satisfactory 
property management services would extend the economic life of a building and thus 
limit the recourse to the more expensive alternatives of redevelopement, or refurbishment 
to minimum. Therefore, one of the purposes for property management is to keep the 
property in a good condition so that the owners can save money for maintenance or 
refurbishment and the economic life of the building can be extended.  
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Another objective for property management is pointed out by Scarrett (1983). He 
suggested that property management will normally be the maximization of income and 
capital. These can be done by achieving short term and long term objectives.  Short term 
objectives mainly focus on day-to-day management which consist of collection of rents, 
prevention of arrears, increase of rent roll, enforcement of lease provisions in relation to 
landlord’s and tenant’s covenants – especially repairing covenants – and adequate 
insurance cover. Long term objective is improvement to the benefit of the capital and or 
rental values of the property.  
 
Muhlebach (1998) also gave a similar objective for property management. He stated that 
institutional owners will expect the property managers to create cash flow and increase 
the property’s value. All of the additional income generated from increased rents goes to 
the property owners minus the management fee. This implied that the value-added 
property is the result of quality of service provided and the management fee. 
 
In short, the importance of property management can be concluded into two points. 
  
(a) To satisfy the physical needs of occupants 
 
Actions 
To provide daily operational service such as cleaning and security 
To provide physical maintenance such as repairing building service facilities. 
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(b) To maintain or increase the value of properties 
 
Actions 
To provide value-added facilities and services  
 
3.4 Institutional arrangement 
 
Institutional arrangement is a set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules 
that establishes the basis of production, exchange and distribution. Property management 
is regulated by law, regulations, code of practice and mutual agreement. If people don’t 
comply with them, they will suffer from civil or criminal proceeding. Institution 
arrangements provide governance framework for property owners. The institutions 
usually clearly stated the rights and obligations of the “Participants” of the property 
which are any person who has the right, power or duty to part in the management of 
building, or a duty to observe or perform obligations concerning the use and enjoyment of 
the land and its buildings. “Participants” includes the government, owners and manager 
(if any), any committee or corporation of owners and, in certain circumstances, tenants 
and occupiers (Kent, Merry, & Walters, 2002). Usually, the institutions provide 
guidelines for decision making and some minimum requirement of the participants. 
 
In Hong Kong, there are two major institutional arrangements which governed the rights 
and obligation of property owners. They are Deed of Mutual Covenant (DMC) and 
Building Management Ordinance (BMO). 
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3.4.1 Deed of Mutual Covenant (DMC)  
 
Property owners of a flat share the same building plot in the form of undivided shares 
over the same site. All lands in Hong Kong are belonged to the government. The property 
owners hold the properties on leasehold and pay government land rent as a form of 
renewal fee for the extension of the land lease. The term “undivided shares” means that 
owners own part of the property (shares) but there is no separate ‘ownership’ of the 
property (undivided). The shareholding represents the co-owners portion. Therefore, the 
shareholders own the property right of a share (unit). They have the exclusive rights to 
use and enjoyment of the unit but common parts are not included. Common parts are 
those facilities required by, or granted to all such as corridor and lift lobby. Any 
shareholder cannot have the exclusive possession of such area. 
 
Deed Mutual Covenant (DMC) is a contract, which is enforced by common law, signed 
by the developer and the first purchaser of a flat in a building and the property manager 
appointed to manage the building. This document is then binding on all subsequent 
purchasers of any unit in the building. 
 
According to (Kent et al., 2002), the theory of freedom of contract suggest that the 
formation of contract is voluntary and the contract itself is a mutual agreement between 
two parties. Therefore, the terms of the DMC are not standard and different from property 
to property and subject to the preference among the developer, manager and owners.  
 
In the old day, most of the DMCs are badly drafted. There were unfair provisions and 
deficiencies contained in them so dispute were raised between the owners and the 
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property managers. To reduce the disagreement between them, the Land Departments has 
issued a Content Scheme which is not a statutory system to provide guidelines for 
drafting the DMCs. Sometime after the issue of the Content Scheme, the government 
changed that to a statutory process. The government may not approve the sale of 
uncompleted premises, unless the developer complies with a series of conditions 
including the well-drafted DMC. The developer need to submit the DMC to government 
and get approval from her so that the developer is able to get a legal title of the property.   
 
There are two types of covenant in DMCs which are positive and negative. A positive 
covenant imposes an obligation to do something, or which is otherwise positive in nature. 
A restrictive covenant prohibits or constrains acts or activities.  
 
The followings are some of the main purposes of the DMC: 
 
• Defines the rights, interests and obligations of owners 
• Specify the uses of different parts of a building 
• Facilitate the employment of property management company 
 
The DMC define the rights and obligations of the parties such as each party has 
ownership of a share entitles and the right to exclusive possession of a part of the building 
specifically designated by the DMC, and to enjoyment of the rents and profits of that part 
of the building. DMC indicate the physical parts of the building intended for separate 
possession or use and some descriptions of common parts with rights of use conferred on 
all the owners. In addition, DMC either appoints or provides for the appointment of a 
manager. The DMC contains express and implied terms which confer powers and impose 
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duties on the manager in respect of the control management and administration of the 
building. 
 
3.4.2 Building Management Ordinance (Cap 344) (BMO) 
 
Building Management Ordinance (BMO) is a statutory provision which provides for the 
management of buildings or groups of buildings and for matters incidental to or 
connected with building management. Williamson (1985) suggested that governance 
structures, or relational contracts, are now commonly seen as substitutes for detailed long-
term exchange contracts. Since the terms of DMC are different from case to case and they 
may not clearly state the rights and duties of the parties, the government imposes this 
Ordinance to supplement the functions of DMC. It provides clear guidelines for the 
owners, managers and all participants for building management.  
 
In 1970, Multi-Storey Buildings (Owners Incorporation) Ordinance was imposed to deal 
with the unfair provisions and deficiencies contained in DMCs. However, there were still 
much more power on the developers and managers than owners, so the Ordinance was re-
titled to Building Management Ordinance (BMO) in 1993 to encourage the formation of 
Incorporated Owner (IO) as statutory legal which have powers to deal on their behalf with 
matters of common interest to all the owners. It empowers, but did not require, owners in 
most developments to form themselves into a corporation with powers to deal on their 
behalf with matters of common interest to all the owners. BMO confers rights and 
imposes management duties on the corporation created under DMC (Kent et al., 2002). 
BMO is independent to DMC but if there is any conflict, BMO will prevail. After the 
issue of BMO in 1993, there are several amendments on the provision of the Ordinance. 
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In 2000, the government wanted to encourage formation of IO, so the BMO was amended 
so that the number of owners required for an IO was reduced. BMO is further amended in 
2007 which aims to assist Owners’ Corporations in performing their duties and exercising 
their powers, safeguard the interests of property owners, and rationalize the appointment 
procedures of a management committee and its members.  
 
Nowadays, the BMO consists of 12 chapters, they are 
 
Chapter 1 – Building Management Ordinance 
Chapter 2 – Owners’ Corporation 
Chapter 3 – Formation of an Owners’ Corporation  
Chapter 4 – Appointment of Members of a Management Committee 
Chapter 5 – Management committee 
Chapter 6 – Meetings of Management Committee 
Chapter 7 – Filing Vacancies of a Management Committee 
Chapter 8 – General Meetings of Owners’ Corporation 
Chapter 9 – Financial Arrangement of Owners’ Corporation 
Chapter 10 – Procurement Arrangement for Owners’ Corporation 
Chapter 11 – Responsibilities and Right of Owners 
Chapter 12 – Duties of Manager 
Chapter 13 – Mandatory Building Management 
 
Code of practice, detailed guidelines for standards of building management and 
maintenance are included in BMO.  Obligations of owners, office bearers management 
committee of owners’ corporation, office bearers of owners’ committees, manager, 
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building managing agents, management companies etc to manage the common parts of 
the buildings are set out.  
 
3.5 Property Management Industry 
 
According to Hong Kong Industry Classification (HKIC), Hong Kong Property Industry 
can be divided into five categories, they are real estate development; real estate leasing, 
real estate maintenance management, real estate brokerage and agency; and real estate 
holding and resale. Census and Statistic Department’s Earnings and Employment Statistic 
Section also divides real estate sector into real estate development; real estate leasing; real 
estate maintenance management; and real estate brokerage and agency. Therefore, 
Property Management Industry is a branch of Real Estate Industry which belongs to real 
estate maintenance management sector.  
 
Property Management is a valued added industry. Provision of professional management 
can enhance the values of properties. The demand for professional property management 
increases due to requirement for a better living environment and as property values 
become highly important to property investors. It results in increased supply of provided 
companies. In consequence, property management industry becomes highly competitive. 
They types and qualities of services provided by PMCs will be greatly dependent on the 
management fee under this competitive industry. Therefore, property management is also 
a price-driven industry.  
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Table 3-1: Value Added in Real Estate Maintenance Management 
 
(Source: Building, Construction and Real Estate Statistics section, Census and Statistic 
Department, March 2008) 
 
From the above table, the value added in real estate maintenance management increases 
from 2002 to 2006, especially from 2004 to 2005, there is 8.5% increase of value added. 
This means that the values of property management increase and the management should 
have positive effects to the value of property. It implies that people would be willing to 
pay for the property management in order to increase the value of their properties.  
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Figure 3-2: Share of Value Added to Real Estate Sectors in 2006 
 
(Source: Building, Construction and Real Estate Statistics section, Census and Statistic 
Department, March 2008) 
 
Property management does not contribute much to real estate sector. Only 12% of value 
added is contributed by maintenance management. The major value added industry is 
development and leasing. In spite of that, property management industry represents a very 
small, but essential part of the over property sector Baldwin (1994). This show the 
importance of property management is real estate industry. 
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Figure 3-3: Income Portfolio of Maintenance Management to Real Estate Sectors in 
2006 
 
(Source: Building, Construction and Real Estate Statistics section, Census and Statistic 
Department, March 2008) 
 
The income portfolio contributed to real estate sector is 34% which is a relative high 
percentage. The can again show the high value of property management industry.  
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3.5.2 Competitive 
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Figure 3-4: Number of Establishment in Real Estate Maintenance Management 
 
(Source: Building, Construction and Real Estate Statistics section, Census and Statistic 
Department, March 2008) 
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Figure 3.5: Number of Persons Directly Engaged in Real Estate Maintenance 
Management 
 
(Source: Building, Construction and Real Estate Statistics section, Census and Statistic 
Department March 2008) 
 
From the above tables, the number of establishment decreases from 2002 to 2004. This 
may be due to the economic downturn and SARS in Hong Kong. At that time, not only 
property management industry, but other industries also suffer from it. After SARS in 
2003, people start to worry about their living conditions. Property management became 
an important industry for maintaining living environment in a good condition. Therefore, 
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there is a sharp increase of the number of establishment in maintenance management. In 
2006, there are nearly 550 firms in this industry. Property management becomes a more 
and more competitive industry.  
 
There is increasing number of people working in maintenance management industry. In 
the past, people have a perception that property management is only about security and 
clearing which is non-skill and simple. However, in recent years, property management 
becomes not only about physical maintenance but also acts as a value-added function. 
Property management becomes professional and highly skilled and more people are 
willing to work in this field. From 2002 to 2006, there is an increasing trend of the 
number of people directly engaged in real estate maintenance management. In 2006, 
almost 28,000 people work in this field.  
 
3.5.3 Price-driven  
 
The services provided by PMCs are different from property to property. Li & Siu (2001) 
has defined some common types of management services: 
  
• Refuse collection 
• Security  
• Clearing services 
• Hawker control 
• Car park management 
• Rent collection 
• Control of dog keeping 
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• Repair and maintenance 
• Handling of complaints 
 
According to Home Affairs Department, the daily operation of building management 
including 
 
• Environmental hygiene 
• Waste separation and recovery 
• Repair and maintenance  
• Crime prevention and security  
• Fire safety  
 
Apart from services for daily operation, the property managers may provide some value 
added facilities and services to the owners and property such as magazines and 
newspapers delivery, laundry, home cleaning, seasonal banquet offer and 24 hour control 
centre.  Some property managers also organize a variety of community and leisure 
activities to enhance residents’ living enjoyment.  
 
Apart from types of services provided by PMCs, quality of service also a major concern 
for property owners for choosing a PMC. DMCs do not clearly specific quality standards 
of management. Minimum standards of building management and maintenance are 
specified in the Code of Practice on Building Management and Maintenance, issued by 
the Secretary for Home Affair. It includes typical provisions on aspects of building 
management such as maintaining the common parts, common facilities and amenities in a 
state of good and serviceable repair and condition; regular inspection and maintenance; 
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and matters of environment hygiene, such as refuse collection, cleansing and repairing 
leaks (Kent et al., 2002). 
 
The specified standards and practices relate to: 
1. Building management  
2. Building safety  
3. Fire safety 
4. Slope safety 
5. Lifts and escalators; and 
6. Utilities and other installations in the common parts of a building 
 
Apart from Building Management Ordinance, there are different statutory ordinances 
which are related to property management. The minimum standard of the property 
conditions are implied in these ordinances. For example: 
 
• Gas Safety Ordinance 
• Fire Services Ordinance  
• Waterworks Ordinance 
• Telecommunication Ordinance  
• Buildings Ordinance  
• Public Health and Municipal Service Ordinance  
• Lifts and Escalators (Safety) Ordinance  
• Noise Control Ordinance 
• Electricity Ordinance  
• Security and Guarding Services Ordinance  
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The quality of services provided by the property manager can be assessed by the awards 
the property managers obtained. There are competitions conducted by different 
organizations in Hong Kong to compare the services provided by different property 
management companies and awards price to property management companies which 
provide high quality services. The awards includes 
 
• The Best Property Management Agent (issued by The Hong Kong Housing 
Authority) 
• Hong Kong Awards for Industries: Customer Service (issued by Hong Kong 
Retail Management Association) 
• Quality Award (issued by Hong Kong Management Association) 
• Q-Mark Certificate (issued by Hong Kong Q-Mark Council) 
• Productivity Award for Services (issued by Hong Kong Productivity Council) 
 
Some property management companies would employ professional staff both ‘front line’ 
service staff and support teams to provide high quality services as well. However, an 
important point should be noted, the types and qualities of service provided by PMCs 
may depend on type of property, age and size of the property. The most important factor 
is the management fee. The higher the fee owner willing to pay, the variety of services 
would be higher especially the values added services. Again, higher the quality, higher 
the management fee should be paid. Li (2005) mentioned that a property management 
company may have to bid for the contract and selection is likely to be based on price and 
quality. Therefore, property management is a price-driven industry.   
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In short, from the statistics, we can conclude that property management is an important 
and high valued industry. Although it does not contribute much to the real estate industry, 
it plays a significant role in it. Based on the increasing number of establishment and 
employee in this industry, it can be concluded that the industry is getting more and more 
competitive. The types and services provided by PMCs are highly dependent on the 
management fee under conditions of an extremely competitive industry.  
 
3.6 Role of Property Manager in Property Management  
 
Property management may be carried out by the owners themselves, by a manager under 
a contract with the owners or the owners’ corporation, by the corporation itself or by a 
combination of some or all of these persons. It is very common in Hong Kong that the 
owners’ corporation employer a manager under a contract to do the works. 
 
According to Walters (1979) the property manager acts as an agent to exercise executive 
supervision over a piece of real estate for an owner in exchange for a fee. The relationship 
between owners and property managers is principal and agency. The owners are the 
principals who delegate the rights of managing the building to the property manager. The 
property manager is the agent who exercises the rights and represents the owners. The 
interests of the owners should be in the first priority.  
 
Someone argues that a property manager only a contractor of the owners but not the agent. 
However, according to Bamberg & Spremann (1987), the actions of contractor are fully 
specified in the contract and the contractors should do the jobs according to the contract. 
Actually, the property managers have the right to manage the property and the power of 
 64 
discretion. They can do their jobs by their own methods, preference and style provided 
that they are accordance with the goals of the owners. Therefore, property manager is not 
only a contractor of the owners but also an agent. The parties’ rights and obligations are 
determined by the DMC or management agreement, and the common law of agency, 
supplemented by equitable rules. An agent has the authority and capacity to create legal 
relations with another person. In other word, the property manager can subcontract the 
management works such as clearing, security and lift service.  
 
The manager’s typical primary purpose is to maximize net income over the economic life 
of the property (Walters, 1979). The services provided by the managers would be 
maintain or increase the values of the property and keep the property in a good condition. 
(Wong et al., 2006) pointed out that property manager is to protect private property rights 
and govern communal private property rights. The functions of property manager can be 
divided into exclusion and internal conflict resolution. For exclusion, the property 
manager prevents people who have no rights to the property from using it. For internal 
conflict resolution, the property manager coordinates and monitors the activities of the 
owners and make sure that they act accordance with their rights and obligations especially 
for the use of communal area. Since no one has exclusive possession of the common area, 
the property manager has to govern the uses and obligations of the owners for that kind of 
areas such as maintenance.  
 
After discussing the relationship between the owners and property managers, then we 
have to identify who the manager is. Under S 34D(1) Part VIA of the BMO, a manager 
means the person who, for the time being, is for the purpose of the DMC managing the 
building. Under S 40B, 40C and 40D of the BMO, a building management agent means a 
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person selected from a list of persons engaged in the business of building management 
compiled from time to time by the Secretary for Home Affairs and published in the 
Gazette. (See Appendix V) 
 
Therefore, the agent must (Kent et al., 2002):  
(1) Be a company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance (Cap 32) or under any 
other HKSAR ordinance; 
(2) Preferably be currently managing a portfolio of 500 residential/commercial units or 
more; 
(3) Have a sound financial background and 
(4) Preferably have a minimum of three years experience in property management in 
Hong Kong and have at least one senior employee qualified as a housing manager or 
surveyor.  
 
Under BMO, there are two ways for appointment of a manager  
 
1. The person who is specified in the DMC to manage the building (i.e. DMC 
manager) 
2. Any other person who for the time being is managing the building for the 
purposes of the DMC. It generally refers to a manager appointed by the owners on 
contract basis (i.e. contract manager) 
 
Therefore, the property manager can be appointed by the DMC or by the owners using a 
contract. In the DMC, it should be expressly require appointment or assignment of a 
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manager. The first manager is selected by the developers and is commonly associated 
with him in some way such as their subsidiary companies.  
 
The initial term of appointment depended on the express terms of the DMC or mutual 
agreement. It is common to find initial term as long as 10 to 15 years, with powers of 
extension for further periods on the same or similar terms (Kent et al., 2002). 
 The owners have the rights to extend, renewal and resign the appointment and BMO does 
not have provision govern it.  
 
Schedule 7 of the BMO sets out the requirements for the manager of a building. Its 
provisions are mandatory terms to be impliedly incorporated into every DMC. In the 
event of any inconsistency between the provisions in Schedule 7 and the terms of a DMC, 
the provisions in Schedule 7 shall prevail. The provisions in Schedule7 shall bind on the 
manager of the building. Both the DMC manager and the contract manager shall comply 
with the requirements stipulated in Schedule 7 
 
There are six major duties mentioned in Schedule 7 in BMO 
 
1. Financial arrangements 
2. Procurement arrangements 
3. Resignation of manager 
4. Termination of manager’s appointment by the Owners’ Committee 
5. Obligations after manager’s appointment ends 
6. Communication among owners 
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For financial arrangements, the manager should open and maintain an interest-bearing 
account which is used for management of the building only. Money received by him put 
in the account immediately. The manager should also establish and maintain a special 
fund to provide for expenditure of a kind not expected to be incurred annually, such as the 
cost of major maintenance works. A budget draft for each financial year setting out the 
proposed expenditure during the financial year should be prepared for every financial 
year. The expected income and expenditure and management fee should be listed in the 
budget. 
 
For procurement arrangements, any supplies, goods or services the values of which 
exceeds or is likely to exceed the sum of $200,000 shall be procured by invitation to 
tender by the manager. If the amount exceeds 20% of the annual budget approval by 
owners’ committee is also needed.  
Value of the supplies, 
goods, or services 
Shall be procured by 
invitation to tender 
Whether a tender is 
accepted or not shall be 
decided at a general meeting 
of the OC/ a meeting of 
owners 
> $ 200,000  - 
> 20% of the annual budget   
 
Table 3-1: Procurement Arrangements under Building Management Ordinance 
  
(Source: Building Management Ordinance Schedule 7, March 2008) 
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The DMC manager can resign by giving not less than 3 months’ notice in writing to the 
owners’ committee while the contract manager should resign their jobs according to the 
contract. On the other side, the owners’ committee can terminate the appointment of a 
DMC manager without compensation by resolution under BMO. For the contract 
manager, the termination should be accordance with the contract. 
 
3.7 Types of Managers 
 
There are different types of property managers in Hong Kong. A property manager is not 
necessary means a property management company. Property mangers can be the property 
owners, an owners’ committee, a government development or simply a property 
management company.  
 
Walters (1979) suggested that there are three types of property management managers. 
They are classified by the serviced provided.  
.  
a. Service organization-providing maintenance and accounting services and 
responding to tenant grievances 
b. Day-to-day operation of rental income property-handling the leasing function and 
maintaining property. 
c. Asset management firms-professional, responsibility for the economic 
performance of a property, recommending how income from the property can be 
invested most effectively. 
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According to Baldwin (1994), There are three major executants in the property 
management industry in Hong Kong. They are: 
 
• Statutory bodies responsible for the management of properties owned and 
developed by the public sector; and  
• Property management agents in the private sector; 
• Participatory building management organizations in the form of owners’ 
corporations, owners committees or mutual aid committees. 
 
Actually, there are four types of property managers in property management industry in 
Hong Kong including: 
 
• Public sector 
• Quasi-public sector 
• Private sector 
• Owners Incorporated and building management organizations 
 
Public sectors 
 
Public sectors are statutory and government bodies involved in property management 
include the Housing Authority and the Housing Society. They are responsible for 
management of public housing and housing under Home Ownership Scheme. In addition, 
there are the Government Property Agency and the Property Services Branch of the 
Architectural Services Department. 
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Quasi-public sectors 
 
Quasi-public sector refer to the Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) and 
universities likewise provide property management services on large-scale residential 
projects co-developed with major private developers. Some of them are financially 
support by the government. 
 
Private Sectors 
 
There are three main types of property managers in private sector. They are developer’s 
subsidiaries, property consultant group and general property management companies.  
 
Developer’s subsidiaries  
 
Developer’s subsidiaries occupy privileged positions which continue to manage a 
development after it has been leased out or sold. According to Li (2005), the reason for 
using developer subsidiaries is the developer need full control of the site for further 
development or maintain good management of the properties they built for quality control 
and good reputation purposes provided that their share of the property rights in the 
community is large enough. The advantages are to minimize interference with the firm’s 
overall investment decision and to minimize the use of incentives for performance with a 
maximization of gains in the process of the transaction. 
 
Lai & Chan (2004) argued that there is no inherent propensity of owners to participate in 
property management affairs through their own corporations. Owners of many housing 
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blocks have simply passively left property management matters to the developer-manager, 
though this is not to say that they must necessarily be very satisfied with the performance 
of such managers. The owners’ choice of “keeping the peace” by not revolting against the 
developer-appointed manage. However, it may not be the case. It is not necessary that 
there is no competition in the industry. Under BMO, the owner’s committee has the right 
to terminate the appointment of the property manager without compensation. Since the 
property market is competitive, it is easy for the owners to replace an unsatisfied property 
manager by a suitable one. The owners may be willing to change instead of “keeping the 
peace” Therefore, the developer’s subsidiaries do not get a lot of benefit based on their 
privileged positions.  
 
Shmishkiss (1988) pointed out that it is bad for sales and bad for the reputation of the 
developer if the developer does not want to be bothered with the day-to-day management 
operations after until owners have moved in, but is reluctant to turn the reins over to an 
independent management firm. Therefore, the services provided by developer subsidiaries 
usually have a higher standard in order to maintain the image of the patent companies. 
The public usually consider them providing high quality services because the image of 
their parent companies. Any adverse actions done by the subsidiaries would directly or 
indirectly affect the image of their parent companies.  
 
Developer subsidiaries usually have experience on managing large complex and 
outsourced contracts. They can be appointed under DMC as the first manager by 
developers or simply employed by owners’ committee.  
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Property Consultant Groups 
 
Property consultant groups provide multi-disciplinary professional property services and 
have abilities to select high quality portfolios. They are very attractive to larger 
investment property owners such as insurance companies and investment companies. 
Most of them are innovative and reliable to deliver professional management services. 
They aim to provide integrated property services and elevate standards of customer 
services to hotel-style levels. Their products and services are designed to enhance asset 
values.  
 
General Property Management Companies 
 
General property management companies are smaller management specific organizations, 
getting fewer resources, basic operational level service. However, in recent year, these 
organizations try to provide professional services to increase their competitiveness. Their 
services provided mainly focus on daily operations such as security and clearing, physical 
maintenance, collection of rents and solving problems among owners. They compete 
among themselves as well as the developer subsidiary.  
 
Resident’s organization  
 
Owners committees (OC) and Incorporated Owners (IO) are the resident’s organizations 
for property management. An OC usually formed under the provision of the DMC and it 
is not a legal entity. The committees are elected by owners who are authorized to act on 
behalf of all the owners. An IO is a statutory body of owners, incorporated under the 
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BMO. It is a single legal entity which acts on behalf of all co-owners.  They usually exist 
in residential properties. The members involves is strongly motivated group of owners. 
The management services can outsource either to a property management company or 
directly the service providers such as security guards and cleaning workers. The self-
managed properties usually are old and involve small number of units.  
 
3.8 Chapter Summary 
 
In short, the property management industry in Hong Kong is investigated. There are two 
purposes of property management. The first one is to extend the economic life of the 
property and maintain it in a good condition. The second one is to maintain or increase 
the value of the property. The major institutional arrangements governed property 
management in Hong Kong are DMC and BMO.  
 
Property management is an important and high valued industry. Based on the increasing 
number of establishment and employee in this industry, it can be concluded that the 
industry is getting more and more competitive. The types and services provided by PMCs 
are highly dependent on the management fee under conditions of an extremely 
competitive industry.  
 
The major types of property managers for private residential properties are developer 
subsidiaries, Property Consultant groups, general property management companies and 
resident’s organizations.  
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Chapter Four - Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The methodology of the research will be discussed in this chapter. A hedonic price model 
will be used for the research. It is the most common method for the research in real estate 
field which used for measuring the implicit price of heterogeneous goods. The model is 
first introduced in this chapter, and then the interpretations of statistics in the model are 
explained one by one. After reading this chapter, the reader should be able to understand 
the rational and application of the model.  
 
4.2 Hedonic pricing model 
 
Hedonic price model is originally invented by Court (1939) and it was further developed 
by Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974). It is also called as Regression Model. Rosen 
(1974) gave a definition of hedonic price, which was 
 
The implicit prices of attributes and are revealed to economic agents from observed 
prices of differentiated products and the specific amounts of characteristics 
associate with them 
 
Mok, Chan, & Cho (1995) suggested that hedonic price model identified the complexity 
and heterogeneity of the housing product and postulate a relation between property price 
and housing attributes. 
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The model is first used to establish the relationship between property values and housing 
attributes. The model is then further applied to not only residential properties but also 
commercial and residential properties. Besides, the attributes are not constraint to housing 
attributes, any factors that would affect the values of the properties can be put in the 
model in order to work out the relationship between them. The decision making of 
property buyers are based on both subjective and objective factors. The objective factors 
can be observed in the environment which is more or less the same among all buyers. For 
the subjective factors, it is based on the preferences, interests and tastes of the property 
buyers which are different among all buyers. Therefore, the prices paid for a same 
property by different owners can be very different. The model can be used to identify the 
underlying parameters of interest that are determinants of the prices of properties. 
  
Ordinary Least Square Technique is used for identifying the contribution of attributes to 
the sale prices of properties. In other word, it is a statistical technique for examining the 
relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables. One point to be 
noted, in order to work out a model with high explanatory and predictive power, it is 
essential to select suitable date and model formation (Fanning, Grisson, & Pearson, 1994).   
 
4.3 Assumptions and Limitations 
 
Like other academic models, hedonic price model has some assumptions to eliminate the 
extreme situations and increase the predictive power of the model. 
 
Pickett & Perrett (1984) pointed out that the value of property should be assumed to be 
made up of the sum of the implicit price of component attributes. Otherwise the 
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relationship cannot be established. Besides, the attributes are non-stochastic and are 
linearly independent of each other. The expected value of the error term should be 
assumed to be zero for all observation which means that there is no bias in the 
measurement. If bias incurs, it should be the same for all attributes.  Then, independent 
variables are not correlated with the error term.  
 
Since the model is used to identify the underlying parameters of interest that are 
determinants of the prices of properties, it assumes that the property buyers have full 
information of the property and the related attributes provided that all these attributes are 
measurable in order to express them in a function.  
 
Despite the model is widely used in the real estate field, limitations still exist. People may 
omit attributes which affects the value of the property. In fact there are plenty of factors 
which affect property values directly or indirectly. It is not easy to identify all of them. 
Sometime, the researchers may find difficulties for collection of data. Gathering data for 
analysis is often difficult and expensive Knight, Dombrow, & Sirmans (1995). Apart 
from these, the choices of sample and functional form also affect the results. In spite of 
the limitations, hedonic price model is still the most commonly used and convenient 
research tool in real estate field. 
 
4.4 Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Techniques 
 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) techniques are used for estimation of the coefficients of the 
hedonic price model. The advantages of the techniques are it can minimize the residual 
sum of square, which is the sum of the squares of the differences between the actual and 
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the forecast values of the dependent variable, in order to find the best solution to the 
regression equation 
 
A regression equation: 
 
Cj = b0 + Σ bi Xij + rj 
 
Where  
 
C is the dependent variable or the regressand  
Xi is the independent variable or the regressor  
ri is the residual 
bi is the OLS estimator of βi which is the true unobservable coefficient of Xi 
 
The coefficients are unbiased which means that the expected values the coefficient is 
equal to the OLS estimators, i.e. E(bi) = βi. The coefficient is efficient with the smallest 
variance. They are consistent so the estimator will approximate the true parameter better 
as the sample size gets larger. 
 
4.5 Function Form 
 
One of the important points for correctly using hedonic price model is to choice the 
suitable function form. Unfortunately, the hedonic price theory provides very little 
guidance on the selection of the appropriate functional form (Butler, 1982). Therefore, the 
selection of functional form depends on previous knowledge on the nature of the 
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relationship between dependent variable and independent variables and the works done 
by previous scholars. The function form can be any mathematical function where linear 
and semi-logarithmic are the most commonly used. If there is no previous work done, 
Wooldridge (2003) suggested that for the most application, choosing a model that can be 
put into the linear regression framework is sufficient. 
 
4.6 Attributes  
 
Attributes in hedonic price model are the factors affecting property values. They are 
sometime called determinants which can be subdivided into macro-determinants and 
micro-determinants. The author only focuses on micro-determinants in this research.  
 
James (1995) suggested that property prices are determined by four basic elementary 
determinants, which are time (date of sales), physical characteristics, location and 
condition of sales. The attributes under this definition are limited to the factors related 
directly to the properties and property transactions. It does not include any external factor 
which may affect the decision of property buyers.  
 
Butler (1982) gave a more extensive definition of housing attributes. They consist of 
location, structural and neighbourhood traits.  
 
Location Attributes 
 
Location is the most important factor affecting the property values. It affects property 
values in a number of ways. Location determines the accessibility to economic and social 
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facilities. Under the theory of land economics, a piece of land which is near to the central 
place would general a higher rent and the price of that land should be higher. Therefore, 
the distance between properties to Central Business District (CBD) would affect the 
property values. Besides, under market mechanism, if the land is more productive, the 
rent of a piece of land will be higher. Certainly, there is relationship between accessibility 
and productivity. People use less time to assess their working places and required 
resources so the time saved can be used for producing higher values of products in other 
word, increase the productivity of them. Alonso (1960) showed that there is a positive 
relationship between the distance from city centre and the property price. The closer to 
the market centre, factors of production are more intensively provided. Therefore, the 
transportation system near central place is more extensive and convenient. Again, Chau & 
Ng (1998) found that a good transportation system would positively affect the property 
price. 
 
Structural Attributes 
 
Structural traits relate to the physical characteristics of a property including age, size and 
floor level. These attributes are directly affected the values of properties and most of the 
researches in real estate field would put these factors to their models as an independent 
variables. 
 
Age 
 
The age of a property implies the physical conditions of the property. Normally, the 
physical conditions of a new building is better than a old building. The building will 
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depreciate as time passes on. In addition, facilitates of a new building are modern and 
usually have higher qualities which should be also complied with the model legal 
requirements. The property owners of a new building can pay lower cost for maintenance 
and repair and have lower risks for rehabilitation and redevelopement. Therefore, 
property buyers are willing to pay a premium for a new building.  
 
Size 
 
Rubin (1998) pointed out that households are willing to pay a higher price for a larger flat 
than a smaller one. It is obviously that if people can enjoy a larger working and living 
area, they will feel more comfortable and satisfied. Therefore, property buyers will pay 
more for a large flat. 
 
There are two common proxies for measuring size of property. The first one is the actual 
size of the property, usually the gross floor area (GFA). Many researches show that there 
is a positive relationship between GFA and property values. The second one is using price 
per square feet which may have negative effect to property value (Mok et al., 1995) due 
to pricing strategy of developers. Therefore, it is more suitable for using the actual GFA 
of the property to measure the contribution of property size to property values. 
 
Floor Level 
 
It is a common perspective that it is good for buying property at higher level. The 
occupiers can enjoy a better view and clear air.  In Li and Brown (1980) study, a higher 
quality view would have a positive effect to residential property prices. Scenic view 
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specially seaview is attractive to property buyer because of fung-shui. Blomquist & 
Worley (1982) agreed that the view of sea and river can increase the property values. Air 
pollution has long been regarded as a negative environmental attribute which affects 
human’s health and thus productivity. Therefore, the quality of air is a major concern of 
property buyers. Anderson and Crocker 1971 in (Wong, Chau, Lai, & Yiu, 2003) used 
suspended particulate level as a measure of air pollution suggesting that air pollution has 
an adverse effect on property values. In addition, noise is a kind of environmental 
nuisance which affects health and productivity as well so the occupiers want to live in a 
higher floor flat to enjoy a quieter environment. Li and Brown 1980 in (Wong et al., 2003) 
suggested that noise (by decibels) has negative effect on property price.  
 
Neighbourbood Attributes  
 
A lot of researches are done to establish the relationship between neighbourhood 
attributes and property values. The attributes can be socially, psychologically or 
economically affected the neighbour Beyer (1967). Crime rate, provision of public 
services, existence of parks and hospital and luckiness of particular lot or floor number 
(Chau, Ma, & Ho, 2001) are some examples for social-demographic aspects. For 
psychological aspect, neighbourhood satisfaction is an important consideration for buying 
property. The study by Beyer (1967) also pointed out that houses with poor qualities that 
surrounded by a community of high quality houses had a higher values. On the other side, 
houses with high qualities that surrounded by a community of poor quality houses had a 
lower values. 
  
 82 
Apart from the three attributes proposed by Butler (1982), there is a type of attribute 
which is important in nature but has been largely ignored by people, it is property 
management. One of the objectives of property management is to increase the value of 
the property so the property management variables should have some contributions to 
property values. Kent, Merry, & Walters (2002) believed the quality of management 
affects property values. Good management is likely to enhance or at least prevent a 
diminution in values. 
  
Hastings & Wong (2006) proposed two reasons for ignorance of property management 
attributes in real estate research. The first one is people believed that when compared to 
other attributes such as property location and amenities, building management is 
negligible in influencing property price. However, based on the literature above, the 
property in Hong Kong is held in multiple-ownership so property management plays an 
important role in governing and coordinating the relationship among owners. The second 
reason is the difficulties in measuring property management attributes. Unlike lot size, 
property management is not a variable that can be measured cardinally and to use an 
ordinal scale would require subjective judgments as to management quality. Therefore, to 
measure the contribution of property management variables to property values, the quality 
of service provided should be kept in constant.  
 
Under, BMO the government has attempted to promote owners’ participation in property 
management and hope that the owners’ committee would be an effective way for property 
owners to take control of their property in lieu of the developer-manager. Lai & Chan 
(2004) investigated the factors which would affect the decision for voluntarily formation 
of owners’ committee by hedonic price model. The factors investigated by them were 
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total number of owners in a property; the age of the property and the location of the 
property. The results showed that new properties with large number of owners located in 
urban area have higher possibility to form an owners’ committee voluntarily.  
   
Hastings & Wong (2006) suggests that the appointment of professional building 
management agents will increase property prices by some 15% and where a statutory, as 
opposed to a contractual, residents’ organization formalizes the governance arrangements 
to a further price premium of some 8% can be achieved. In other word, the existence of 
an institutional arranagement for collective decision making and the existence of property 
management company add value to properties. Based on the findings, the contributions of 
the nature of the property management company to property values are further 
investigated in this research. 
 
4.7 Dummy Variables 
 
Dummy variables used for attributes which are qualitative in nature but not quantitative. 
The examples of dummy variables are existence of seaview and facilities such as schools 
and hospitals with are related to the qualitative conditions of the property. The variables 
cannot measure in number term but are discontinuous factors which take on only two 
values, either 0 or 1 on the hedonic price model. The results explain the effects to 
property values when certain conditions present or absent.   
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4.8 Statistic Interpretations 
 
In the previous, the theory and logic of hedonic price model has been examined. In this 
section, some major interpretations of the statistic results are discussed which included 
the coefficient of the regression equation, standard error of coefficient, t-statistic, p-values 
and coefficient of determination. 
 
4.8.1 Coefficient 
 
The coefficients of the regression equation are the estimators of the attributes which 
explain how the dependent variable is affected by the independent variables holding all 
other factors constant. They measure the contributions of independent variables to 
dependent variable. The sign of the coefficient represents the nature of the effects either 
positive or negative. The value of the coefficient represents the magnitude of impact, in 
other word, the degree of influence. The larger the value, the greater the impact. 
 
4.8.2 Standard error of coefficient 
 
Standard error of coefficients is the sample estimates of the standard deviation associated 
with the regression coefficient. Similar to standard deviation, it measures the spread of 
data around the estimated regression line. Therefore, small value of standard error gives a 
coefficient with high accuracy so that the productivity of the model increases. 
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4.8.3 T – statistic and p-value 
 
T-statistic  
 
T-statistic measures the statistical significance of the independent variables to dependent 
variables. The higher value of t-statistics, the higher possibility that the coefficient is 
different from zero so it is most likely affects the dependent variables. If the t-statistics 
are greater than the critical value and degree of freedom (d.f.), the coefficient is 
significant at the given significance level.  
 
T-statistics equal to the absolute value of coefficient over the standard error to that 
coefficient. The large the value, the more accurate the estimate 
 
Ti = | 
Sbi
bi
 | 
 
Where bi is coefficient 
            Sbi is the standard error of coefficient  
 
Degree of freedom for t-statistic is the number of observation minus the number of 
constraints placed on the data by the calculation procedure 
 
d.f. = N – (k+1) 
 
where N = number of observation  
           k = number of independent variables 
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Statistical significance is independent to magnitude of the coefficients. The independent 
variable can only have some impact of the dependent variables but it is highly significant.  
 
P-values 
 
P-values have similar functions to t-statistic but it is more correct and commonly used in 
researches to explain the significance of the impact of independent variables to dependent 
variables. The closer the p-value to zero, the more significant the variable is. If the p-
value is 1, it means that the chance of that coefficient equals to zero is equal or lower that 
1 %. In other word, the coefficient is significant at 5% level or significant at 99%. 
confidence level. 
 
4.8.4 Coefficient of determination – R2 
 
Coefficient of determination (R2) represents the proportion of variation in the dependent 
variable explained by the variation in the dependent variables. It is often used as a 
measure of how good the OLS regression line fits the data. The value is range from 0 to 1. 
Chau & Ng (1998) suggest that higher R2 value gives a higher level of homogeneity in the 
property samples. It determines the explanatory power of the hedonic equation. However, 
the value of R can be increase by adding more independent variables. Adjusted R2 instead 
of R2 is used to tackle this problem. Adjusted R2 cannot be higher than R2 but it can be 
negative if the model is poorly specified. 
 
The calculation of Adjusted R2 (Radj2) is  
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Radj2 = 1-(1- R2) kN
N
−
−1
 
 
Where N = number of observations  
           K = number of independent variables (excluding the constant) 
 
4.9 Chapter Summary 
 
Hedonic price mode is widely used in real estate field which is comprehensive and simple 
to use. The relationship between property values and attributes can be established by a 
simple statistical technique – OLS technique. Attributes can be consisted of location, 
structural, neighbourbood as well as property management traits. Property management 
attributes are important but have been largely ignored in the past. The research bases on 
previous study to establish a model to investigate whether the nature of the property 
management company have any contribution to property values. The detailed empirical 
model will be demonstrated in the next chapter.   
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Chapter Five – Empirical Model 
 
Part One: Hedonic Price Model 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
After the introduction of hedonic price model in chapter four, an empirical model is 
devised to examine how the nature of property managers affects property values. The 
hypotheses for the empirical test are first stated. The introductions of function form, 
dependent and independent variables of the hedonic price model also included in part one 
of this chapter. In part two, the data collection for this research will be illustrated.  
 
5.2 Hypotheses  
 
There are three hypotheses in this research  
1. Properties managed by Incorporated Owners (IO) have a positive effect on 
property prices. 
2. The properties managed by Incorporated Owners (IO) and a Property 
Management Company (PMC) have a further positive effect on property prices. 
3. Properties managed by Incorporated Owners (IO) and a Property Management 
Company (PMC) which is a Developer Subsidiary (DS) have a further positive 
effect on property prices.  
The first two hypotheses were confirmed by Hasting & Wong (2006). The study of this 
research is based on the confirmation of the first two hypotheses then to test whether the 
third one is correct.  Therefore, it is essential to test the first two hypotheses first to 
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confirm the two hypotheses are correct in the research sample. Then, the third hypotheses 
can be tested. The first two hypotheses are tested in stage one research and the last one is 
testified in stage two.  
 
5.3 Dependent Variables  
 
The dependent variable is property values which can be represented by the property 
transacted price. According to Chau and Ng (1998), a large simple size will help to build 
up a more accurate estimation, so the transacted property prices used for this research are 
not only come from one year but also past few years. Since property price are always 
affected by the changing economic environment, the real property prices should be used 
in this research instead of nominate property prices to eliminate the effect of time and 
inflation or deflation of property market. In other word, to avoid overestimated or 
underestimated property prices are used in this research and make sure that the fluctuation 
and different in transaction price is due to the independent variables we want to 
investigate rather than due to the overall market trend. Therefore, the model will be more 
accurate.  
 
In this research, the transacted property prices are deflated to its actual price by the 
private domestic price index issued by the Rating and Valuation Department (See 
Appendix VI). The average prices used for calculated the index are based on an analysis 
of transactions scrutinized by the Department for stamp duty purposes. The index is 
commonly used as a deflator in real estate field. 
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5.4 Independent Variables 
 
Independent variables are the factors likely to affect the dependent variables. In this 
research, the independent variables are the attributes which affect property values. As 
mentioned in chapter four, attributes affecting property values can be consisted of 
location, structural, neighbourhood and property management attributes. Wittink (1998) 
believed that more independent variables are fitted into the model, more likely the model 
with give a full reflection the actual situation. However, there are a lot of attributes that 
may affect the residential property price so due to a lack of resource and time, it is 
impossible to include all attributes in the model. In order to increase the accuracy of the 
model, the most important attributes are included dependently on the extent to which a 
chosen variation in the dependent variables 
 
The location attributes should be the most important factors determining property values. 
Instead of putting location as an independent variable, the research keeps the data sample 
in a relative independent and small region which does not contain mass transportation 
system such as MTR. Since the properties are located in a small region, the 
neighbourhoods of them are very similar. They enjoy very similar living environments 
and public services. Therefore, the location and neighbourhood traits can be kept in 
constant in this research by choosing a particular research area. 
 
Keeping the location and neighbourhood attributes constant, the remaining independent 
variables are structural and property management attributes. It is generally agreed that 
inclusion of more variables may help to increase the predictability of the model, but it 
will increase the complexity of the analysis as well. For simplicity, only the factors which 
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have great impacts to property values and the investigated factors will be included in the 
model.  
 
5.4.1 Structural Attributes 
 
Structural attributes refer to the factors related to the physical conditions of the property. 
The factors include size, age and floor level. 
  
Size 
 
Gross Floor Area (GFA) of the property, a proxy for living space in the flats, is used to 
present the size of property. According to Building Ordinance (Cap. 123), GFA is defined 
as “the area contained within the external walls of the building measured at each floor 
level together with the area of each balcony in the building, which shall be calculated 
from the overall dimensions of the balcony and the thickness of the external walls of the 
building. There are different types of proxies for living space such as Useable Floor Area 
(UFA) and Salable Floor Area (SFA) but it is easier to collect data of GFA as it is 
available in some real estate research tools like Economic Property Research Centre 
(EPRC).  
 
Rubin (1998) believed that households are likely to pay more for a larger and newer unit 
in turn for a better living condition. Therefore, the size of property will have a positive 
effect to property values. One point should be noted, the property values should be the 
actual transacted price rather than price per square feet as it may have negative 
relationship between them due to pricing strategy of developers.  
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Age 
 
The age of the building implied the physical conditions of the building and the usability 
of the user in having a modern life Mok, Chan, & Cho (1995). Building will depreciate 
over years. People can spend less money on repair and maintenance when living in a new 
building. They can also bear lower risk of rehabilitation when living in a new building. 
Therefore, property buyers are willing to pay new building a premium over similar older 
units. In order word, the age of building have a negative effect to property value. 
 
Floor level 
 
Floor level represents the virtual height of the property. It is more desirable to live in 
higher floor level than lower because of a number of reasons. Public roads, highways and 
construction sites usually very close to residential property due to limited supply of lands 
in Hong Kong. The polluted air and noise generated by them seriously affect the health of 
occupiers. Living in higher floor, the occupiers can enjoy better air quality and quiet 
environment.  
 
Apart from these, living in higher floor can enjoy better scenic views especially seaview. 
Due to the concept of fung-shui in Chinese people, they believed that view of seas, rivers 
and lakes can increase wealth.  
 
Higher the floor, the more expensive the flat (Mok et al., 1995). Certainly there is a 
positive relationship between floor level and property values.  
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5.4.2 Property Management Attributes 
 
Property management attributes have been ignored for a long time but it is especially 
important for properties in Hong Kong as the owners of properties share the undivided 
shares of the properties with each other. To coordinate and govern the uses of both 
common and private areas in the building and maintain a good relationship among owners, 
property management plays an important role on them. The government in Hong Kong 
encourages property owners to form owner’s committee to control the management of 
their building. Under BMO, the owners can form an Incorporated Owners (IO) to manage 
the properties. It also empowers the IO to appoint property management companies as an 
agent to manage the properties as well. As mentioned in chapter three, property 
management is a value-added industry, so it must have some contribution to property 
values.  
 
Incorporated Owners (IO) 
 
 IO is a statutory body of owners, incorporated under the Building Management 
Ordinance (Cap. 344). The IO is designed as a single legal entity which can act on behalf 
of all co-owners. The rights and duties of the IO are mainly governed by the ordinance 
and related to the control, management and insurance of the common parts, together with 
appointment, monitoring and control of any appointed property manager. According to 
the study of Hastings & Wong (2006), a building managed by an IO without a PMC was 
sold at an 8.1 percent discount to a building managed by an OC and a PMC. This 
indicates that even under a statutory entity, only owner participation on property 
management without professional PMC cannot enhance the values of property. However, 
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it is believed that property owners are willing to pay a premium for collective decision 
making governance structure under a statuary entity instead of property does not have any 
resident’s organization.  Since there is sound mechanism for IO to make decisions on 
property management issues under BMO and sometime in DMC such as voting 
mechanism. This can reduce the collective action when decisions are made by a large 
group of people. Therefore, even building managed by without any PMC can be sold at a 
premium to a building without any resident’s organization.  
 
Incorporated Owner with a Property Management Company (IOPM) 
 
There is no requirement under the ordinance for owners to incorporate or to appoint a 
property manager except the provisions for appointment of a property manager in DMC 
(i.e. DMC manager). Property owners have a choice to appoint property managers to 
managing their building or self-managed by IOs. Refer to Hastings & Wong (2006), a 
15% increase of property price can be achieved for appointment of professional building 
management agents due to the professional management services provided by them. 
Therefore, properties managed by IO together with property management company (PMC) 
can be sold at a price premium.  
 
5.4.3 Investigated Attributes – Developer Subsidiaries 
 
Developing the research of Hastings & Wong (2006), the research is further investigated 
whether the nature of the PMC in Hong Kong has any effect on property values. Refer to 
the principal-agency theory mentioned in Chapter Three, owners’ committee or simply 
the IO is the principal and the property manager is the agent. The owners can freely 
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choose any kinds of PMCs to act on behalf of them. Three major types of PMCs in Hong 
Kong are developer subsidiaries, property consultant groups and general PMCs. Due to a 
lack of data and simplicity, only developer subsidiaries and general PMCs are 
investigated in this research. Generally speaking, people have a perception that developer 
subsidiaries should provide better quality of service or can manage their properties better 
than general PMCs due to reputation of their parent companies. They commonly choose 
developer subsidiaries instead of general PMCs.  In the research sample, the developer 
subsidiaries generally manage more properties in their portfolios than general PMCs (See 
Appendix VII). Therefore, it is worth to conduct an empirical study to investigate whether 
the property owners are willing to pay a price premium for a property managed by 
developer subsidiaries.  
 
According to Chau, Ng and Hung (2001) study, the impacts of the goodwill of developers 
in affecting the price of their property sold. The result shows that buyers are willing to 
pay more than 7% premium for the goodwill of the developer. The similar logic can be 
applied to the developer subsidiaries as they can gain reputation from their parent 
companies (i.e. developers). DeCarlo (1997) also confirmed reputation is the key issue to 
be considered for selection of PMCs. Therefore, we expect that there is a positive 
relationship between properties managed by developer subsidiaries and property values.  
 
5.5 Regression Equation  
 
The empirical study is consisted of two stages. The first stage is followed the study of 
Hastings & Wong (2006) but in a different area in Hong Kong to investigate the 
contributions of IO and IO with PMC to property values. Hastings & Wong (2006) 
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suggested that IO with PMC contributes more to property values compared with IO, so 
the study implied that property owners are willing to appoint a PMC to manage their 
property in order to increase the values of the properties. In other words, self-
management by IO would not be the best choice of property owners in general situations. 
In the second stage, after confirming the impact of PMC on property values, the types of 
PMC appointed by property owners is investigated to find out whether there is 
contribution of management by developer subsidiaries to the value of the property.  
 
Stage One 
 
The regression equation used by Hastings & Wong (2006) is shown in the followings: 
 
P = β1IOPM + β2IO + α0 + α1AGE + α2AGE2 + α3FLR + α4FLR2 + α5SIZE + α6SIZE2 + 
α7BLK + α8BLK2 + α9MTR + α10MTR2 + t
T
t
tTIME∑
=1
γ + ε 
IOPM = Properties managed by IO and a PMC 
IO = Properties managed by IO without a PMC 
AGE = Building age 
FLR = Floor level of a flat 
SIZE = Flat size 
BLK = Number of blocks per development 
MTR = Distance to MTR stations 
 
The equation used in this research is similar to it but due to the different sample is 
adopted, some modifications should be made. In general, property price (P) is affected by 
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location (L), structural(S), neighbourhood (N), property management (PM) attributes as 
well as time (T).   
 
P = f (L, S, N, PM, T) 
 
Since the research sample is within a neat and small region where location and 
neighbourhood attributes can be kept in constant as explained above, the regression 
equation does not need to include these two factors. The time effects are eliminated by 
deflating the property price by private domestic index issuing by Rating and Valuation 
Department. Therefore, MTR and Time factors can be deleted. All the buildings in the 
research sample are single-block so it is not necessary to add BLK to measure estate 
effects. FLR2, SIZE2 and AGE2 are remained in order to provide a more flexible 
functional form, so as to capture any diminishing or magnifying effect of these factors on 
the property price in order to enhance the predictability of the estimated model.  
 
After modification, the model for stage one research is  
 
P = β1IOPM + β2IO + α0 + α1AGE + α2AGE2 + α3FLR + α4FLR2 + α5SIZE + α6SIZE2 + ε 
 
Stage Two 
 
After confirming the contribution of IO and PMC to property values, further investigation 
of the impact of nature of the PMC on property values is conducted in stage two. A linear 
function form is used which similar to stage one as their natures are more or less the same. 
A dummy variable, Developer Subsidiaries (DS), is added to represent properties 
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managed by Developer Subsidiaries as it is qualitative in nature The data used in this 
model is only the transacted prices of properties which managed by an IO and a PMC.  
The regression equation is: 
 
 P = β1DS + α0 + α1AGE + α2AGE2 + α3FLR + α4FLR2 + α5SIZE + α6SIZE2 + ε 
 
5.6 Expected Signs of Coefficients of Independent Variables  
 
The sign of a coefficient will determine the impact on the dependent variable. Positive 
sign represents the independent variables enhance the property values while negative sign 
represent the independent variables have adverse effects to the dependent variable. Based 
on the literature reviews and author’s expectations, the signs of coefficients of 
independent variables are expected as following: 
Independent Variables  Expected Sign 
IO Positive 
IOPM Positive 
DS Positive 
AGE Negative 
AGE2 Uncertain 
FLR Positive 
FLR2 Uncertain 
SIZE Positive 
SIZE2 Uncertain 
Table 5-1: Expected signs of coefficient of independent variables in the empirical 
model 
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Part Two: Data Collection 
 
5.7 Sources of Data 
 
The transacted property prices are researched from a real estate research database called 
Economic Property Research Centre (EPRC) which contained details of property 
transactions that have registered in the Land Registry. Every transaction is also recorded 
in the Land Office by a memorial entered on the Date of Instrument, which officially 
marks the transfer of ownership. The details include property name, age, address, floor 
level, views, occupation permit and types of facilities. The transaction data in the 
database starts from 1991.  
 
The residents’ organizations and property management bodies of the properties are 
obtained from “database of private buildings in Hong Kong” in Home Affair Department 
website. It is a central database of all private buildings, including residential, commercial, 
and industrial ones, provides basic information to the public on buildings in all districts, 
such as number of units and storeys, as well as information on building management 
bodies, and so forth.  
 
The details of property management companies are obtained from the website of The 
Hong Kong Association of Property Management Companies Ltd which was formed in 
1990 by a group of leading property management companies in conjunction with the 
Chartered Institute of Housing (Asian Pacific Branch), the Hong Kong Institute of 
Housing, the Hong Kong Institute of Surveyors and the Royal Institute of Chartered 
Surveyors (Hong Kong Branch). It provides basic details of their members including age, 
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number of director and portfolio. Some detailed are obtained for the websites of PMCs or 
by directly interview with their managers.   
 
5.8 Sample 
 
The properties investigated are located in Aberdeen and Tin Wan in South District (See 
Appendix VIII). The region are independent and do not have any mass transportation 
system such as MTRC nearby. Therefore, the location factors can be kept in constant. All 
the private residential properties are included in the sample except properties in Aberdeen 
Centre to eliminate the estate effect. There are 100 private residential buildings in total 
and the ages of are range from 7 to 45 years. The property mangers of these properties are 
either an IO or an IO with a PMC. 16% of transacted properties do not have any 
resident’s organization or PMC to manage them. 
 
As mentioned before, property management industry is extremely competitive. By 
researching the average management fees of different PMCs in the sample, they are range 
from $1.39-1.48 per square feet which is a very narrow range (Appendix IX). Actually, 
under the conditions of an extremely competitive industry, the PMCs can only charge for 
the costs of services provided and administrative fee so little excesses can be gained by 
the PMCs. The services provided by PMCs are mainly price-driven. Therefore, the 
qualities and types of services provided to similar buildings by different PMCs should be 
very similar if the management fee is indifferential. In addition, all the buildings are 
single-block buildings which are low to middle-class buildings. The services provided by 
PMCs are mainly related to daily operations such as cleaning, security and maintenance 
works. None of them provides any outstanding service which is different from their 
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competitors. By keeping management fee and quality of services constant, any different 
of property prices must not be due to these two factors but other non-price factors such as 
reputation.  
 
5.9 Time Period 
 
The time period selected in this research is from 2001 to 2006. The predictive power of 
the model may be enhanced by including more data in it but it has a higher risk that the 
economic environment may change substantially within a long period of time. Hong 
Kong is economically and politically stable during 2001 to 2006, there is no major change 
of the property market except the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
in 2003, but the time effect can be minimized by deflating the data by proper index.  
 
5.10 Chapter Summary 
 
The empirical model for testing the three hypothesis of the research is introduced in this 
chapter. By keeping location and neighbourhood attributes constant, the model only 
testifies the structural and property management attributes. The model aims at 
investigating whether property owners are willing to pay a price premium for a property 
managed by an IO and a developer subsidiary. As the number of property managed by 
developer subsidiaries is commonly greater that general PMCs, it is predicted that there is 
a positive relationship between property values and developer subsidiaries. However, it is 
irrelevant to the quality of service provided as property management is a price-driven 
industry. The more you paid the higher quality you can get. Therefore, the positive effect 
should be due to other factors such as reputation. Properties in Aberdeen and Tin Wan are 
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selected for this research because they are rather independent. The average management 
fees of different PMCs and services provided by them are more or less the same which 
suit for this research. 
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Chapter Six: Empirical Findings 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The empirical model has been introduced in Chapter Five. In this Chapter, the findings of 
the model are reported and analyzed. The expected results in Chapter Five will also 
compared with the findings 
 
6.2 General Results and Data Analysis 
 
There are 1018 transactions data for stage one research and 755 for stage two research. 
The dependent variable is in log scale so the coefficients of the independent variables 
should be interpreted as a percentage change in property price, given a unit change in an 
independent variable. The results are detailed discussed below. 
 
6.2.1 Stage One Research 
 
The following is the general details of the transaction data for stage one research.  
 
  Mean Std dev Min Max 
Property Price 
(HK$ mil) 
P 1.45 0.41 0.12 4.28 
Building Age (year) AGE 19 7.92 7 45 
Floor Level  FLR 16 8.03 1 41 
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Flat Size (sq ft) SIZE 436.25 112.42 229 1223 
IO with PMC (%) IOPM 63 - - - 
IO without PMC 
(%) 
IO 
21 - - - 
No residents' 
organization (%) 
- 16 - - - 
  
Table 6-1: General details of transaction data for stage one research 
 
The regression equation for stage one is  
 
P = β1IOPM + β2IO + α0 + α1AGE + α2AGE2 + α3FLR + α4FLR2 + α5SIZE + α6SIZE2 + ε 
 
The table below shows the findings of stage one. 
Predictor Coefficient SE Coeficient T-statistic  P-value 
Constant 13.2332 0.1071 123.61 0.000*** 
IO  0.1272 0.0340 3.75 0.000*** 
IOPM   0.1606 0.0184 8.71 0.000*** 
AGE -3.28 x 10-3 4.98 x 10-3 -0.66      0.510 
AGE2 -4.97 x 10-4 1.24 x 10-4 -4.01 0.000*** 
FLR 1.13 x 10-3 3.43 x 10-3 0.33 0.071* 
FLR2 1.96 x 10-4 9.95 x 10-5 1.97 0.049** 
SIZE 2.94 x 10-3 3.09 x 10-4 9.54 0.000*** 
SIZE2 -1.07 x 10-6 3.00 x 10-7 -3.53 0.000*** 
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R-square                                                                                                                   64.2% 
Adjusted R-square                                                                                                    63.9% 
 
Notes:  
 *     significant at the 10 per cent level 
**    significant at the 5 per cent level 
***  significant at the 1 per cent level 
Table 6-2: Empirical findings of stage one research 
 
The adjusted R-square value of the model is 63.9% and most coefficient are significant at 
the 1 per cent level. The standard errors of the coefficient are range from 26% to 51%. It 
can be concluded that the model is significant in general.  
 
The coefficient of IO is positive and significant at the 1 per cent level, indicating that 
property owners are willing to pay extra price premium 12.72% to buy a property with IO 
over a property without resident’s organization. In other word, property owners are prefer 
to a statuary resident’s organization acting on behalf of them to managed their properties. 
The powers and duties of IO are specified in BMO to manage the property. An IO also 
has the statuary right to appoint, monitor, control and dismiss of any appointed PMC. 
Property can be sold at a premium because of a better mechanism for property 
management. 
 
The next coefficient is IOPM which is also positive and significant at 1 per cent level. 
The magnitude of the coefficient is 0.1606 which implied that a property managed by IO 
with a PMC can be sold at a premium 16.06% over a property without resident’s 
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organization. 16.06% is statistically and economically significant. Property owners prefer 
to have a PMC to manage their properties instead of IO only due to the professional 
management skills and services of PMC. 
 
The coefficient of AGE2 is negative and significant, indicting that properties depreciated 
at an increasing rate. This means that the rate of certain change of age for an old building 
to property price is large that the same rate of change for a new building. The coefficient 
of FLR2 is 1.96 x 10-4 which is significant at 5 per cent, representing that property prices 
was rose with floor level at an increasing rate. Both coefficients of SIZE and SIZE2 are 
significant. Positive sign for coefficients of SIZE means property price increase with size 
of flat. SIZE2 has a negative sign, indicating property price was rose in a diminishing rate. 
 
6.2.2 Stage Two Research 
 
The following is the general details of the transaction data for stage two research.  
  Mean Std dev Min Max 
Property price  
(HK$ mil) 
P 
1.50 0.51 1.20 4.28 
Building age (year) AGE 18 6.80 2 36 
Floor level FLR 17 8.73 1 37 
Flat Size (sq ft) SIZE 439 108.97 229 829 
Developer 
Subsidiary (%) 
DS 
50.06% - - - 
General PMC (%) - 49.94% - - - 
Table 6-3: General details of transaction data for stage two research  
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The regression equation for stage two is  
 
P = β1DS + α0 + α1AGE + α2AGE2 + α3FLR + α4FLR2 + α5SIZE + α6SIZE2 + ε 
The table below shows the findings of stage two. 
 
Predictor Coefficient SE Coefficient T-statistic P-value 
Constant 12.7963 0.1575 81.25 0.262 
DS 0.1120 0.0209 5.36 0.000*** 
AGE -0.0227 -6.166 x 10-3 -3.69 0.012** 
AGE2 -6.44 x 10-4 1.65 x 10-4 -3.91 0.002*** 
FLR 0.0148 5.25 x 10-3 2.81 0.005*** 
FLR2 6.08 x 10-4 1.46 x 10-4 4.16 0.000*** 
SIZE 3.01 x 10-3 5.84 x 10-4 5.16 0.104 
SIZE2 -1.06 x 10-6 6.00 x 10-7 -1.75            0.012** 
R-square                                                                                                                       54.5% 
Adjusted R-square                                                                                                        53.1% 
 
Notes:   
**    significant at the 5 per cent level 
***  significant at the 1 per cent level 
Table 6-4: Empirical findings of stage two research 
 
The standard errors of the coefficient are range from 25-52%. The value of adjusted R-
square is 53.1% and most of the coefficients are significant at 99 per cent confident level 
which indicted that the model is significant in general. However, the explanatory power 
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of the model is relative low because the independent variables added in the model are 
insufficient. The independent variables are generally unlimited so only the important 
variables are added in the model. Besides, the research sample can keep the location and 
neigbourhood attributes constant so it is not necessary to add them in the model.  
  
The results of the structural attributes including building age (AGE, AGE2), floor level 
(FLR, FLR2) and size of flat (SIZE, SIZE2) are similar to stage one. The transaction data 
is a part of the data used in stage one so the effects of structural attributes to property 
price should be very similar. 
 
The coefficient of DS is positive and significant at 1 per cent level. Assuming the 
qualities of PMCs are the same and the services provided are similar, property owners are 
prefer to buy a property managed by an IO and a developer subsidiary instead of an IO 
and a general PMC. They are willing to pay 11.20% price premium for this. In other word, 
properties managed by IO and developer subsidiaries can be sold at a premium of 11.20% 
over properties managed by IO and general PMCs.  
 
By adding the results of stage one and stage two, a property managed by an IO and a 
PMC which is a developer subsidiary can be sold at together 27.26% (16.06% + 11.20%) 
premium over a property manage without resident’s organization. It is a very huge 
amount. This shows the importance of having a particular type of PMC. The owners are 
willing to pay more for a developer because of their reputation.  
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6.3 Comparison with Expected Results 
 
Independent Variables  Expected Sign Actual Findings 
IO Positive Positive 
IOPM Positive Positive 
DS Positive Positive 
AGE Negative Negative 
AGE2 Uncertain Negative 
FLR Positive Positive 
FLR2 Uncertain Positive 
SIZE Positive Positive 
SIZE2 Uncertain Negative  
 
Table 6-5: Comparison between expected and actual results 
 
The actual findings from the model are the same with the expected results so the 
hypothesis can be proved scientifically. The findings support the three hypotheses are 
correct.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
The empirical evidences presented in this chapter suggest that the formation of an IO to 
managed properties will increase the property price by 12.72%. Property can be sold by a 
higher price premium 16.06% if managed by an IO and a PMC together. If a property is 
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managed by and IO and a PMC which is a developer subsidiary, a further price premium 
of 11.2% can be achieved.  
 
The findings of the empirical study prove scientifically that the three hypotheses of this 
research are correct.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
The results of stage one and stage two are reported in Chapter Six. In this chapter, the 
results will be discussed. The contributions and limitations of this research will also be 
examined. 
 
7.2 Discussion  
 
7.2.1 Stage One Research  
 
Refer to Hastings and Wong (2006), they suggested that the existence of IO and PMC can 
add value to properties. This argument is tested in stage one of the research by using a 
different research sample. From the findings, properties managed by IO can be sold at a 
premium 12.72% over properties without resident’s organization. A further 16.06% price 
premium is found if properties managed by IO with PMCs. The findings confirm the 
study of Hastings and Wong (2006)as well as the first two hypotheses of this research 
which are “Properties managed by Incorporated Owners (IO) have a positive effect on 
property prices” and “The properties managed by Incorporated Owners (IO) and a 
Property Management Company (PMC) have a further positive effect on property prices”. 
 
Empirical findings can be explained adopting an institutional economics approach in the 
following way.  High rise and multiple-ownership are the common characteristics of 
private residential properties in Hong Kong. Properties held in multiple-ownership the co-
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ownership rights are structured as a system of tenants-in-common. Property owners hold 
the undivided shares of the properties. Owners have the rights to use the common areas 
but not exclusive use or possess that area. Under this situation, property owners have to 
decide how to use, access and control of this kind of areas in order to optimize the use of 
that areas. The decisions are made by all owners so it is a collective action. People are 
assumed to be selfish under economic theory. They seek ways to maximize their utilities 
and interests. Despite it being in their best interest, individuals will not necessarily co-
operate to solve a collective action problem and will only agree to collaborate where there 
is sufficient incentives (Hastings & Wong, 2006). The more people involved in the 
decision making process, the more difficult to work out an optimized solution for a 
collective problem. Walters (2002) proposed that decisions making under hierarchy is less 
costly than market as number of owners increases. IO acts as a hierarchy structure for 
decision making by property owners. It is extremely important in Hong Kong as most of 
the private residential properties involved large amount of owners. Therefore, property 
managed by IO can make collective decisions more efficient. Property owners are willing 
to pay a price premium for having an IO.  
 
The empirical results indicating that properties managed by IO and PMCs can enhance 
16.06% of property values. An explanation can be provided by Principal and Agency 
Theory discussed in Chapter Two.  
 
PMCs act as agents of property owners. The agents usually have more information of 
their actions. PMCs have higher skills and more information for managing a property. 
They can outsource the daily operations such as clearing and security to other service 
providers. Again, they have more information of the providers and can choose a suitable 
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one for a particular property. A PMC generally not only manages one property but a few 
of them. Repeated dealing can lower the risk for making mistakes. The costs of 
researching information are low because they already get certain information and 
knowledge of the transactions. Negotiation costs can also be reduced due to the similar 
nature of transactions.  Therefore, the use of PMCs to manage properties creates a lower 
transaction cost. Besides, professional property facilitates and services which can be 
provided by them increase the values of properties. The qualities of serviced provided by 
PMCs are higher than self-management. As a result, properties managed by IO together 
with a PMC can be sold at a premium.  
 
7.2.2 Stage Two Research 
 
After confirming the impact of PMC on property values, in stage two, the types of PMC 
appointed by property owners is further investigated to find out whether the property 
owners will to pay a price premium for a property managed by a PMC which is a 
developer subsidiary. Assuming the qualities of PMCs are the same and the services 
provided are similar, a property managed by IO and a developer subsidiary can be sold at 
a premium of 11.2% over a property managed by a general PMC. The empirical results 
confirm the third hypothesis “Properties managed by Incorporated Owners (IO) and a 
Property Management Company (PMC) which is a Developer Subsidiary (DS) have a 
further positive effect to property prices”. One of the possible explanations is choosing 
developer subsidiary can lower the transaction costs of property owners because of the 
reputations of developer subsidiaries. The results can be explained by institutional 
economic and agency theory. The detailed discussion is shown in the following. 
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For an IO to appoint a PMC to manage their properties, two costs are incurred in the 
process. The first one is management fee which is the payment for services provided by 
PMCs. The second is transaction costs which involved in both the pre-contract stage and 
post-contract stage.  
 
The property management industry is highly competitive as explained in Chapter Three. 
It is a price-driven industry and the types and qualities of serviced provided by PMCs are 
largely dependent on the management fee paid by the owners. Generally, the management 
fee is the costs of services provided plus an additional administrative fee. Little excesses 
can be gained by PMCs. Therefore, it can be assumed that the types and standards of 
services are very similar if the management fee is within a very narrow range. In addition, 
the buildings chosen for this research are all single-block building and similar in nature. It 
can be further confirmed that the service types and quality are more or less the same. By 
keeping the management fee and types and qualities of services constants, any different in 
property price will be due to the other costs paid by property owners which include 
transaction costs and agency costs.  
 
Williamson (1985) suggested that transaction costs consist of Search and Information 
Costs, Negotiation and Bargaining Costs and Monitoring and Enforcement Costs as 
mentioned in Chapter Two. The first two categories mainly incur before the appointment 
contracts are signed. The last is incurred when the contract has been signed. 
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Pre-contract stage  
 
Search and Information Costs 
 
The committees of IOs prefer to get as much as information about PMCs in order to 
compare and select the most suitable one for managing their properties. To lower the risks 
for making wrong decision, information is essential. However, they commonly do not 
have much information and knowledge about property management as well as PMCs 
since property management is a specific and professional industry.  
 
An abstract of an article in “Choice” magazine was published in the website of Home 
Affair Department which introduced the procedures and common practice for owners to 
choosing a suitable PMC. Since there is no statuary guideline to help owners choosing 
PMCs, they commonly ask for advice about quality of management and management fee 
of different PMCs from other owner occupiers or resident’s organizations within the 
community. If the situation of building is similar to their own building, committee 
members will go for a visit to that property to investigate the security, clearance, internal 
and external structural conditions, facility maintenance of that property and also ask for 
occupiers’ opinions. Apart from these, approaches the IO committees can browse the 
websites of PMCs in order to get more information about the companies, the services and 
facilities provided by them and also their property portfolio. After that, they will ask the 
several suitable PMCs to submit proposals which included the types, quantity and 
distribution location of public facilities, management fee, insurance, employment record, 
labour insurance, security, contractors for clearance and transport waste, electricity and 
water maintenance, life maintenance, telephone networks etc.  
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The selection of a PMC is not a frequent decision for an IO. It usually occurs when there 
is termination of the existing PMC due to completed contract periods. Kent, Merry, & 
Walters (2002) stated that it is not uncommon to find the initial term [of appointment 
contract] is as long as 10 to 15 years so IOs do not have much experience or knowledge 
about selection of a PMC. As a result the organization bears higher search and 
information costs because the transaction is non-frequent in nature.  
 
In Chapter One, it is shown that developer subsidiaries generally managed more 
properties than other types of PMCs. It can be implied that they have more experience in 
managing different kinds of residential property and can provide more comprehensive 
details of property management and databases for outsourcing. Besides, all the developer 
subsidiaries within the research sample have a website which introduces and details the 
services and facilities provided by them and their property portfolio. It is easy for owners 
to assess the relevant information in a lower costs way. 
 
On the other side, it is often difficult for owners to find information on general PMCs 
because they usually managed small number of properties and may not promote 
themselves to any extent and owners can only access the information through directly 
meeting with the managers of PMCs or on phone. Websites may not generally available 
or may lack sufficient details and only briefly introduce the company. Therefore, owners 
need to spend more time and resource to find out the details. 
 
As a results, the committees of the IOs can obtain comprehensive information from 
developer subsidiaries in a lower cost way.  
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Bargaining and Negotiation Costs 
  
After negotiation among committees of IOs, the IOs will choose the best PMC. IOs and 
the selected PMC will have meeting to negotiate the management details such as 
management fee, facilities and services provided and procurement arrangements. The 
contract terms will also be discussed including appointment period, method of dismissal, 
financial arrangements, resignation of manager and obligations after manager’s 
appointment ends.  
 
The above process involved Bargaining and Negotiation costs. Most of the PMCs use 
standard form of contracts to minimize the negotiation costs. However, the standard form 
of contract may not be suitable because of the changing environment. Repeated or 
frequent dealings can help to improve the details of contract terms and the scope of 
services provided by them (Williamson, 1985). Since developer subsidiaries have more 
transactions than general PMCs, the contract terms provide should be more reasonable 
and comprehensive than general PMCs. Therefore, the negotiation costs can be reduced. 
 
Bargaining and Negotiation Costs can be reduced by warranties and guarantees. This 
mechanism can work well if reputation is important. As mentioned in Chapter Three, 
reputation is extremely important to developer subsidiaries. It is not only affected by 
themselves but also their parent companies so they will try their best to do their jobs well. 
Developer subsidiaries have a high chance to comply with their warranties and guarantees 
than general PMCs. As a result the property owners can choose to accept their warranties 
or guarantees to lower the Bargaining and Negotiation Costs.  
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Again, choosing developer subsidiaries can reduce the Bargaining and Negotiation Costs. 
 
Post-contract stage  
 
After the contract has been signed between IO and PMC, the only job the PMC has to do 
is complying with the contract and IO has the duty to monitor PMC’s works and enforce 
the contract terms.  
 
Monitoring and Enforcement Costs 
 
Since the goals of property owners and PMCs are different and are sometime even in 
conflict with each other. Due to the uncertainties in the contract, PMCs are in a position 
take advantage and have the tendency to be self-interest seeking. Under this situation, the 
functions and values of the properties cannot be fully utilized in the owners’ point of view. 
In other word, the property owners may suffer from the actions of PMCs 
 
In the interests of owners, the IO must monitor the behaviour of PMC to see whether their 
actions comply with the contract they signed. The costs of monitoring and enforcement 
are very high because it may be difficult to measure the work done by PMCs. The 
property owners as well as the committees of IO do no have capacity to assess whether 
the PMC truly complies with the contract or not. The services provided to the property 
owners may be satisfactory but it does not mean that PMC has done all the jobs specified 
in the contract. Since the contract can not clearly specified all the tasks the PMC should 
do but only the scope of duties, it is difficult to judge whether the contract terms have 
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been fulfilled or not. Hence despite the conditions, it is still necessary for the IOs to 
monitor the actions of their PMCs.  
Based on the literature review in Chapter Two, the reputation of the agents is the most 
efficient and effective incentive to reduce opportunistic behaviours of agents as well as 
the enforcement costs. 
 
Hong Kong is relatively small so the information flow is very fast and extensive. Any bad 
performance by PMC can be extensively spread through Hong Kong by media within a 
day. The reputation of that PMC will be easily and quickly destroyed. It is very costly to 
rebuild the reputation. Under the conditions of high uncertainty and competitiveness in 
property management industry, a good reputation is extremely important for attracting 
new customers and retaining existing clients. Reputation is particular important for 
developer subsidiaries as the reputations of developer subsidiaries directly affect the 
brand image of their parents companies since not only the property management industry, 
but also the property development industry are affected. Many property owners select a 
particular PMC only because it is a particular developer’s subsidiaries. If the reputation is 
destroyed, the developer as well as the subsidiaries will suffer a huge loss. Therefore, to 
maintain a good reputation, developer subsidiaries have a lower tendency for 
opportunistic behaviour and the enforcement costs incurred by owners can be lowered. 
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The comparison between transactions costs involved for appointment a developer 
subsidiary and a general PMC by property owners are concluded as following: 
 
Types of Transaction 
Costs 
Developer Subsidiaries General PMCs 
Search and Information 
Costs  
Lower Higher 
Negotiation and Bargaining 
Costs 
Lower Higher 
Monitoring and 
Enforcement Costs 
Lower Higher 
Agency Costs  Lower Higher 
   
Table 7-1: Comparison of transaction costs involved in the owners direct 
appointment of a PMC 
 
In short, under the conditions of a similar type and qualities of services and facilitates 
provided by PMCs and nearly uniform management fee paid by owner, the property 
owners would choose a type of PMCs  incur lower transaction costs to them. It explained 
why property owners are willing to pay a price premium for appointment of developer 
subsidiaries.  
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7.3 Conclusion 
 
The research question is: 
 
“Does the nature of the property management company have any impact on the price of 
private residential property in Hong Kong?” 
 
The author uses an institutional approach to answer this question. In Chapter Two, the 
concept of institutional arrangement and transaction costs are reviewed. An institutional 
arrangements consist of formal and informal “rules” which govern human interactions 
and provide a framework within which human interaction take place. Transaction costs 
are the costs incurred by human interactions. They include Search and Information Costs, 
Negotiation and Bargaining Costs and Monitoring and Enforcement Costs. They cannot 
be eliminated but only be reduced. Institutional arrangements are designed to minimize 
transaction costs. Transaction costs are affected by the characteristics of the transaction 
(Asset specificity, Frequency and Uncertainty) and human behaviour (Boundary 
Rationality and Opportunism)   
 
In Chapter Two, agency costs are also introduced. These are a form of transaction costs 
created as a result of the principal and agency interaction. The relationship is established 
when the principal delegates his/her own rights to the agent. The agent has the power of 
discretion when making decision provided that interest of principal is in the first priority. 
Since the divergence of interests between of principal and agent and opportunistic 
behaviour of agents, costs are incurred for monitoring, enforcement and benefit loss and 
are collectively called agency costs. An agent will avoid opportunistic behaviour to 
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maintain reputation and it is the effective way to minimize the enforcement costs incurred 
to owners.  
 
The investigation of property management industry in Hong Kong is studied in Chapter 
Three. There are two main purposes of property management. One is to satisfy the 
physical needs of occupants and the second one is to maintain or increase the value of 
properties. Property management is a value-added industry. In Hong Kong, Deed of 
Mutual Covenant (DMC) and Building Management Ordinance (BMO) are the two major 
institutional arrangements to govern the management of property. Under the institutional 
environment in Hong Kong, the property management industry has developed who an 
extremely competitive and price-driven process. Assuming the management fee and 
services provided by the PMCs are constant, the nature of the PMCs may be another 
factor affecting the choice of property owners. In other word, property owners may be 
willing to pay a price premium for a particular type of PMC. 
 
A hedonic price model is used as an empirical test in this research. The study is based on 
the assumptions that professional property management enhances the value of property. 
The model is used for finding out how property price is affected by a particular type of 
PMC. The degree of influence can also be worked out. Developer subsidiaries and 
general PMCs are investigated in this study. The sample chosen for the research is private 
properties in Aberdeen and Tin Wan which are single-block buildings and similar in 
nature.  Some of them don’t have any resident’s organization. Some of them does have 
one and appoint PMCs to manage their properties as well. The PMCs are either developer 
subsidiaries or general PMCs. The management fee and types and serviced provided by 
PMCs are more or less the same.  
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The results of the models show that the three hypotheses of the research are correct. 
Property owners are willing to pay a premium of 12.72% for a property managed by IO 
and 16.06% for a property managed by an IO and a PMC compared with a similar 
property without resident’s organization. There is positive and significant relationship 
between property managed by developer subsidiaries and property values. A property 
managed by an IO and a PMC which is a developer subsidiary can be sold at a premium 
11.2% over property managed by an IO and a general PMC. This can be explained using 
an institutional analysis. As choosing a developer subsidiary can lower the transaction 
costs of the owners due to repeated dealings and maintaining reputation, property owners 
are willing to pay a price premium for that type of company.  
 
7.4 Contributions of the Research 
 
The research confirms the study by Hastings & Wong (2006). By testing the model using 
a different sample in Hong Kong, it is confirmed that the existence of an Incorporated 
Owners (IO) for collective decision making and the existence of PMCs does add value to 
property. In other word, in the absence of a regulatory environment which ensures the 
management of multiple-ownership property assets, owners are recommended to form an 
Incorporated Owners (IO) as a governance structure and appoint a of professional 
property management company.  
 
The research provides a start to study of the impact of nature of PMC on property values 
in Hong Kong and the first to investigate the impact of nature of PMCs on the price of 
private residential property. Among the different types of property management 
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companies, developer subsidiaries are recommended for managing private residential 
properties as the IO or the property owners can bear a lower transaction costs for both in 
the pre-contract and post-contract stages.  
 
7.5 Implications of the Research  
 
The demand for property management is increasing in Hong Kong because people 
emphasize the high standard of living environments. Professional PMCs can help for 
providing better living conditions and increase the value of the properties. The research 
suggests that property owners can bear lower transaction costs for appointment of 
developer subsidiaries. However, both developer subsidiaries, general PMCs and other 
types of PMCs coexist in the property management industry in Hong Kong. It implied 
that the others PMCs have their comparative advantages over developer subsidiaries. It 
may be price or non-price related factors. This can be explained by further research.  
 
7.6 Limitations of the Research  
 
The findings of the empirical study may not be generalized because the study is carried 
out in one district in Hong Kong. The sample itself is very unique in the physical 
environment and institutional arrangements. Besides, the comparison is only between 
developer subsidiaries and general PMCs but not other types of PMCs in Hong Kong 
such as property consultant group. In spite of these, it is adequate to prove a positive 
relationship between property price and developer subsidiaries.  
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The major assumptions of this study is keeping the types and qualities of services 
provided by PMCs constant and the management fees paid by property owners are within 
in the very narrow range. Therefore, the research can focus on the impact of natures of 
PMCs to private property prices. It may not be easy to find other research samples 
satisfied the assumptions in Hong Kong. However, the assumptions are not restrictive, 
they can be released for further researches to work out more generalize models.  
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Appendix I: Statistics on Private Domestic - Average Prices by Class ( $ per sq. m) 
 
A B C D E Class Less than 40m2 40m2 to 69.9 70m2 to 99.9 100m2 to 159.9 160m2 to above 
Year HKI KLN NT HKI KLN NT HKI KLN NT HKI KLN NT HKI KLN NT 
1988 13,940  13,852  12,112  13,911  10,906  11,472  14,714  13,107  12,315  15,655  13,646  12,147  17,163  (17,628) 11,124  
1989 18,076  17,698  14,379  18,343  14,670  14,102  18,949  17,278  14,150  20,089  17,054  14,790  21,751  (20,823) 12,827  
1990 20,775  19,590  15,909  20,976  16,347  15,650  20,698  19,079  12,666  20,514  18,087  15,498  20,174  (24,425) 15,038  
1991 27,917  25,422  23,145  28,755  21,926  22,454  28,505  25,486  19,100  27,100  22,185  20,863  25,490  28,536  19,910  
1992 38,930  34,552  32,881  41,152  30,676  32,539  44,019  35,934  30,623  42,941  33,326  34,200  40,902  41,588  30,146  
1993 42,905  37,770  36,019  48,154  36,473  37,002  52,781  44,805  34,669  53,242  39,920  41,822  52,759  49,305  40,966  
1994 52,209  42,682  41,203  62,044  42,067  42,189  72,028  54,335  42,908  74,627  47,392  53,548  82,911  63,661  59,010  
1995 49,324  41,369  38,883  56,066  39,609  39,424  63,740  49,584  39,713  67,433  47,376  47,929  74,031  65,824  53,362  
1996 52,369  43,721  41,713  62,125  42,836  43,230  74,573  55,321  46,601  82,364  52,923  54,889  93,657  74,247  58,670  
1997 69,206  56,544  59,323  83,159  54,523  59,899  104,021  77,485  72,566  115,082  79,841  79,521  135,544  128,516  80,549  
1998 50,687  42,155  42,063  57,203  40,880  40,935  71,676  61,639  49,259  7,009  71,109  51,977  88,213  96,633  56,499  
1999 41,861  35,471  35,735  49,287  37,095  35,042  60,751  43,952  41,192  65,659  50,325  47,353  77,537  71,226  47,514  
2000 35,975  30,990  31,444  43,656  31,711  31,358  54,957  38,515  37,324  63,194  46,639  41,389  80,222  70,992  44,589  
2001 31,922  26,560  27,883  38,783  28,317  27,841  49,358  33,792  32,685  56,904  40,968  34,812  70,312  58,686  35,676  
2002 29,012  23,324  24,455  34,177  24,722  24,646  42,116  30,654  29,522  51,801  37,582  31,953  65,725  49,840  35,326  
2003 25,746  20,867  20,843  30,497  22,020  21,317  40,375  28,143  26,743  48,352  34,204  30,500  66,281  55,400  34,461  
2004 32,535  25,233  26,611  41,716  33,058  28,023  56,808  46,837  35,698  66,291  62,070  41,912  94,478  75,240  44,483  
2005 39,158  29,896  30,529  49,266  38,868  32,684  66,634  56,516  41,584  82,482  73,046  49,987  115,358  96,641  57,151  
2006 43,906  30,470  28,060  25,776  37,575  30,337  69,930  54,964  41,326  89,658  73,962  50,183  113,587  (93,350) 56,143  
2007* 57,105  41,512  35,136  68,567  55,000  37,071  91,636  91,978  47,969  119,781  112,892  60,946  175,750  145,530  81,627  
Notes: 
*   Provisional figures  
( )  Indicates fewer than 20 transactions 
Changes in average prices between different periods may be due to variations in the characteristics of the different properties being analysed, and should not be taken as 
indicating a general change in value over the period.   
 
(Source: Private Domestic - Average Prices by Class, Rating and Valuation Department, March 2008) 
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Appendix II:  Domestic Sales - Number of Sales and Purchase Agreements 
 
Year Number of Sales and Purchase Agreements 
2002 72,974 
2003 71,576 
2004 100,630 
2005 103,362 
2006 82,472 
2007 123,575 
Notes: 
The figures are derived from sale and purchase agreements of domestic units received for registration in 
the Land Registry for the relevant periods. They generally relate to transactions executed up to four 
weeks prior to their submission for registration. Sales of domestic units refer to sale and purchase 
agreements with payment of stamp duty. These statistics do not include sales of units under the Home 
Ownership Scheme, the Private Sector Participation Scheme and the Tenants Purchase Scheme except 
those after payment of premium. 
 
(Source: Domestic Sales - Number of Sales and Purchase Agreements, Rating and 
Valuation Department, March 2008) 
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Appendix III: Awards obtained by Property Management Companies  
 
Name of PMC Developer Subsidiary 
Quality Award (issued by Hong Kong Management Association) 
Chevalier Property Management Ltd  
EastPoint Property Management Ltd  
Hong Yip Service Company Limited  
Jones Lang LaSalle Management Services 
Ltd 
 
Kai Shing Mgt Services Ltd  
Savills Property Management Ltd  
Hong Kong Q-Mark Service Scheme (issued by Hong Kong Q-Mark Council) 
EastPoint Property Management Ltd  
Hang Yick Properties Management Ltd  
Hong Yip Service Company Limited  
Best Property Management Agent 2003 (issued by Hong Kong Housing Authority) 
Hong Yip Service Company Limited  
Guardian Property Mgt Ltd  
Kai Shing Mgt Services Ltd   
Synergis Management Services Ltd  
Urban Property Management Ltd  
 
(Source: 
 
The Hong Kong Management Association, March 2008 
 
Federation of Hong Kong Industries, March 2008 
 
Hong Kong Housing Authority, March 2008) 
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Appendix IV: Number of Property Managed by Different Types of Property 
Management Companies  
 
 
Developer Subsidiaries  
 
 
Name No of property Managed 
Chissay (Property Management) Ltd 13 
CityBase Property Management Ltd 57 
Goodtech Management Ltd 11 
Goldwell Property Mgt.Ltd. 47 
Goodwill Management Ltd 30 
Hang Lung Real Estate Agency Ltd 57 
Hang Yick Properties Management Ltd 174 
Hong Yip Service Company Limited 418 
Hong Kong Land Group Limited 14 
Hop On Management Co Ltd 36 
Hopewell Property Management Co Ltd 11 
Hutchison Whampoa Properties Ltd 34 
Hysan Property Management Ltd 12 
Kai Shing Mgt Services Ltd 143 
ISS Eastpoint Property Management Ltd 350 
Kiu Lok Service Management Co Ltd 4 
Kolot Property Services Ltd 37 
Liu Chong Hing Property Management & Agency Ltd 19 
Main Shine Development Ltd 78 
MTR Corporation Ltd 43 
Protech Property Mgt Ltd 37 
Shui On Properties Management Ltd 24 
Sino Estate Management Ltd 170 
Swire Properties Management Ltd 32 
Synergis Management Services Ltd 263 
Urban Property Management Ltd 230 
Well Born Real Estate Management Ltd 17 
Wells Estate Services Ltd 3 
Total: 2364 
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General PMCs 
 
 
Name No of property Managed 
Cayley Property Management Ltd 17 
China Resources Property Management Ltd 7 
City Professional Management Ltd 10 
Eternal Year Property Services Ltd 47 
Excellent Smart Property Management Ltd 36 
Fore Glory Management Ltd 31 
Guardian Property Mgt Ltd 190 
Harriman Property Management Ltd 26 
International Property Management Ltd 41 
Kenwick Property Management Ltd 21 
Land Asia Management Ltd 5 
New Gem Property Mgt & Agency Ltd 46 
Nice Property Management Ltd 9 
Parkland Property Mgt Ltd 73 
Plotio Property & Mgt Co Ltd 84 
Silver Sight Property Management Ltd 6 
Sky Pacific Property Consultant Ltd 36 
Stanhill Property Ltd 8 
Stratton Property Management Ltd 9 
Sun Chung Property Management Co Ltd 18 
Sunbase International Properties Management Ltd 26 
THL Management Co Ltd 8 
Top Property Services Co Ltd 5 
Vigers Property Management Services (HK) Ltd 36 
Well Sight Property Management Ltd 5 
Wellart Property Management Ltd 3 
Yoshiya Property Management Ltd 23 
Total: 628 
 
 
Property Consultant Groups 
 
 
Name No of property Managed 
Jones Lang LaSalle Management Services Ltd 226 
Knight Frank Petty Ltd 112 
Savills Property Management Ltd 171 
Total: 509 
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Others 
 
 
Name No of property Managed 
Chevalier Property Management Ltd 3 
China Overseas Property Service Ltd 62 
Kerry Property Management Services Ltd 29 
Paul Y Building Management Ltd 7 
China Merchants Property Management (HK) Ltd 37 
The Great Eagle Properties Management Co Ltd 20 
Yue Xiu Property Management Ltd 8 
Total: 166 
 
 
Summary 
 
 
Developer 
Subsidiaries 
General 
PMC 
Property 
Consultant 
Groups 
Other  Total 
2364 826 509 166 3865 
 
(Source: The Hong Kong Association of Property Management Companies Ltd, March 
2008) 
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Appendix V:  List of Building Management Agents under Building Management 
Ordinance  
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 138 
 
 139 
 
 
(Source: Home Affairs Department, March 2008) 
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Appendix VI: Private Domestic Price Index 
 
Year Month A B C D E 
1 78.9 80.5 83.4 88.4 94.6 
4 81.9 81.4 84.6 87.5 90.0 
7 78.7 80.5 81.8 83.0 88.7 
2001 
10 72.7 74.4 75.7 78.8 80.9 
1 72.6 74.5 75.1 78.2 84.0 
4 70.4 72.7 74.3 77.9 84.9 
7 69.0 71.4 72.3 77.2 80.8 
2002 
10 64.0 64.7 68.7 75.1 77.2 
1 61.5 63.4 67.2 72.6 79.9 
4 59.4 59.8 64.1 67.7 72.6 
7 56.6 58.3 61.1 64.9 73.4 
2003 
10 61.3 62.5 68.6 73.8 80.4 
1 66.4 68.8 75.4 81.1 92.2 
4 73.4 79.2 89.3 98.1 101.7 
7 70.0 74.0 83.9 93.4 103.5 
2004 
10 77.6 83.2 95.8 106 117.1 
1 78.6 84.5 98.9 112.7 124.0 
4 88.5 94.5 110.2 120.7 134.8 
7 84.9 92.2 109.3 122.4 129.0 
2005 
10 85.8 90.5 107.1 121.6 135.9 
1 84.1 90.7 105 117.5 136.7 
4 86.6 92.9 109.8 121.9 138.8 
7 85.7 91.2 106.4 117.8 133.2 
2006 
10 87.3 91.5 108.1 123 135.3 
Notes:       
( ) Indicates fewer than 20 transactions.     
Prices for properties in the New Territories were gradually added by district from the first quarter 
of 1984. Since the first quarter of 1987, all districts have been included. Due to rounding, the re-
based indices here in respect of earlier years may differ slightly from converting past published 
figures. Also, a standard weighting method is adopted here to derive composite indices which for 
earlier years in the 1980s may not tally with past published figures using a different weighting 
mechanism 
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(Source: Rating and Valuation Department, March 2008) 
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Appendix VII: Number of Property Managed by Different Types of PMCs in the 
Research Sample 
 
 
Developer Subsidiaries  
 
 
Name Number of Property Managed 
CityBase Property Mgt Ltd 57 
Goodwell Property Mgt.Ltd. 47 
Hang Yick Properties Mgt Ltd 174 
Hong Yip Service Company Limited 418 
Kai Shing Mgt Services Ltd 143 
Urban Property Mgt Ltd 190 
Total:  1029 
 
 
General PMCs 
 
 
Name Number of Property Managed 
Cheuk Nang Property Mgt Co Ltd 7 
Chissay Mgt Ltd 13 
East Point Property Mgt Service Ltd 350 
Eternal Year Property Services Ltd 47 
Harbour field Property Mgt Co Ltd 20 
Hon Hing Enterprises Ltd 12 
Kenwick Property Mgt Ltd 21 
New City Property Management Co. Ltd 29 
New Gem Property Mgt & Agency Ltd 46 
Parkland Property Mgt Ltd 73 
Plotio Property & Mgt Co Ltd 84 
PP Mgt Consultants Co Ltd 31 
Unimax Property Consultancy Ltd 19 
Wah Sing Property Mgt Ltd 22 
Wellpoint Mgt Ltd 15 
Total: 789 
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Others  
 
 
Name Number of Property Managed 
City Professional Mgt Ltd 10 
Guardian Property Mgt Ltd 190 
Protech Property Mgt Ltd 37 
Total: 273 
 
 
Summary 
 
 
Developer Subsidiaries General PMC Other  Total 
1029 789 273 2055 
 
(Source: The Hong Kong Association of Property Management Companies Ltd, March 
2008) 
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Appendix VIII: Location of Research Areas 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Centamap http://www.centamap.com/gc/home.aspx) 
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Appendix IX: Average Management Fee of the Research Sample 
 
 
Name Average Management Fee per sq ft 
Cheuk Nang Property Mgt Co Ltd 1.39 
Chissay Mgt Ltd 1.43 
City Professional Mgt Ltd 1.46 
CityBase Property Mgt Ltd 1.42 
East Point Property Mgt Service Ltd 1.41 
Eternal Year Property Services Ltd 1.44 
Goodwell Property Mgt.Ltd. 1.41 
Guardian Property Mgt Ltd 1.39 
Hang Yick Properties Mgt Ltd 1.48 
Harbour field Property Mgt Co Ltd 1.39 
Hon Hing Enterprises Ltd 1.42 
Hong Yip Service Company Limited 1.43 
Kai Shing Mgt Services Ltd 1.41 
Kenwick Property Mgt Ltd 1.45 
New City Property Management Co. Ltd 1.45 
New Gem Property Mgt & Agency Ltd 1.42 
Parkland Property Mgt Ltd 1.41 
Plotio Property & Mgt Co Ltd 1.48 
PP Mgt Consultants Co Ltd 1.45 
Protech Property Mgt Ltd 1.42 
Unimax Property Consultancy Ltd 1.40 
Urban Property Mgt Ltd 1.46 
Wah Sing Property Mgt Ltd 1.42 
Wellpoint Mgt Ltd 1.48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
